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Sonja B. Starr* 
Forthcoming, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, Vol. 66 (2014) 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper critiques, on legal and empirical grounds, the growing trend of basing 
criminal sentences on actuarial recidivism risk prediction instruments that include demographic 
and socioeconomic variables. I argue that this practice violates the Equal Protection Clause and 
is bad policy: an explicit embrace of otherwise-condemned discrimination, sanitized by scientific 
language.  To demonstrate that this practice should be subject to heightened constitutional 
scrutiny, I comprehensively review the relevant case law, much of which has been ignored by 
existing literature.  To demonstrate that it cannot survive that scrutiny and is undesirable policy, 
I review the empirical evidence underlying the instruments.  I show that they provide wildly 
imprecise individual risk predictions, that there is no compelling evidence that they outperform 
judges’ informal predictions, that less discriminatory alternatives would likely perform as well, 
and that the instruments do not even address the right question: the effect of a given sentencing 
decision on recidivism risk.  Finally, I also present new, suggestive empirical evidence, based on 
a randomized experiment using fictional cases, that these instruments should not be expected 
merely to substitute actuarial predictions for less scientific risk assessments, but instead to 
increase the weight given to recidivism risk versus other sentencing considerations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an age-old 
problem.  People have never ceased to hope and strive to move closer to that goal. ... In 
this tradition, our own constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection both 
call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious discriminations.…[T]he 
central aim of our entire judicial system [is that] all people charged with crime must, so 
far as the law is concerned, stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every 
American court.”  
--Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956) 
Criminal justice reformers have long worked toward a system in which defendants’ treatment 
does not depend on their socioeconomic status or demographics, but on their criminal conduct.  
How to achieve that objective is a complicated and disputed question.  Many readers might 
assume, however, that there is at least a general consensus on some key “don’ts.”  For example, 
judges should not systematically sentence defendants more harshly because they are poor or 
uneducated, or more lightly because they are wealthy and educated. They should not follow a 
policy of increasing the sentences of male defendants, or reducing those of females, on the 
explicit basis of gender.  They likewise should not increase a defendant’s sentence specifically 
because she grew up without a stable, intact family, or because she lives in a disadvantaged and 
crime-ridden community.  
It might surprise many readers, then, to learn that a growing number of U.S. jurisdictions are 
adopting policies that deliberately encourage judges to do all of these “don’ts.”  These 
jurisdictions are directing sentencing judges to explicitly consider socioeconomic variables, 
gender, age, and sometimes family or neighborhood characteristics—not just in special contexts 
in which one of those variables might be particularly relevant (for instance, ability to pay in 
cases involving fines), but routinely, in all cases. This is not a fringe development.  At least eight 
states are already implementing some form of it.  One state supreme court has already 
enthusiastically endorsed it.1  And it now has been embraced by the American Law Institute in 
the draft of the newly revised Model Penal Code—a development that reflects its mainstream 
acceptance and, given the Code’s influence, may soon augur much more widespread adoption.2  
There is a similar trend in Canada, the United Kingdom, and other foreign jurisdictions.3  
Meanwhile, the majority of states now similarly direct parole boards to take demographic and 
socioeconomic factors into account. 
The trend is called “evidence-based sentencing” (hereinafter EBS).   “Evidence,” in this 
formulation, refers not to the evidence in the particular case, but to empirical research on factors 
predicting criminal recidivism.   EBS seeks to help judges advance the crime-prevention 
objectives of punishment by equipping them with the tools of criminologists—recidivism risk 
prediction instruments grounded in regression models of past offenders’ outcomes.  The 
instruments give considerable weight to criminal history, which is already central to modern 
sentencing schemes.  However, they also add something new: explicit inclusion of gender, age, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564 (Ind. 2010). 
2 Model Penal Code: Sentencing § 6B.09 (Discussion Draft No. 4, 2012) (hereinafter “Draft MPC”).   
3 See James Bonta, Offender Risk Assessment and Sentencing, 49 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 519, 519-20 
(2007). 
4
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 90 [2013]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/90
66 STANFORD LAW REVIEW __ (FORTHCOMING 2014) 
	   2	  
and socioeconomic factors such as employment and education (with socioeconomically 
disadvantaged, male, and young defendants receiving higher risk scores).  Some instruments also 
include family background, neighborhood of residence, and/or mental or emotional disorders. 
EBS has been widely hailed by judges, advocates, and scholars as representing hope for a 
new age of scientifically guided sentencing. The idea is to replace judges’ “clinical” evaluations 
of defendants (that is, reliance on their own expertise) with “actuarial” risk prediction, which is 
purportedly more accurate.  Incongruously, this trend is being pushed by progressive reform 
advocates, who hope it will reduce incarceration rates by enabling courts to identify low-risk 
offenders.  In this Article, I argue that they are making a mistake.  As currently practiced, EBS 
should be seen neither as progressive nor as especially scientific—and it is almost surely 
unconstitutional.  
This Article sets forth a constitutional and policy case against this approach, based on 
analysis of both the relevant doctrine and the empirical research supporting EBS.  I show that the 
current prediction instruments should be subject to heightened equal protection scrutiny, and that 
the science falls short of allowing them to survive that scrutiny.  The concept of “evidence-based 
practice” is broad, and I do not mean to issue a sweeping indictment of all its many criminal 
justice applications.  Indeed, I strongly endorse the general objective of informing criminal 
justice policy with data.  Nor do I argue that actuarial prediction of recidivism is always 
inappropriate.   My objection is specifically to the use of demographic, socioeconomic, and 
family status variables to determine whether and how long a defendant is incarcerated.  I am 
concerned that a well-intentioned desire for data-driven decision-making is causing 
discrimination to be rationalized based on rather weak empirical evidence. I focus principally on 
the instruments’ use in sentencing, but virtually the same case can be made against their use in 
parole decisions, which is now established practice in thirty states. 
The technocratic framing of EBS should not obscure an inescapable truth: sentencing based 
on such instruments amounts to overt discrimination based on demographics and socioeconomic 
status.  The instruments typically do not include race as a variable (even their most enthusiastic 
defenders have limits to their comfort with group-based punishment), but sentencing based on 
socioeconomic predictors will have a racially disparate impact as well.   Equal treatment of all 
persons is a central normative objective of the criminal justice system, and EBS may have 
serious social consequences, contributing to the concentration of the criminal justice system’s 
punitive impact among those who already disproportionately bear its brunt.  Moreover, the 
expressive message of EBS—the justification of disparate treatment based on statistical 
generalizations about crime risk—is, when stripped of the anodyne scientific language, toxic.  
Group-based generalizations about dangerousness are not innocuous; they have an insidious 
history in our culture.  And the express embrace of additional punishment for the poor conveys 
the message that the system is rigged.   
The instruments’ use of gender and socioeconomic variables should be subject to heightened 
constitutional scrutiny.  Gender is the only equal protection issue the existing literature pays any 
attention to, but I show that the socioeconomic variables trigger similar scrutiny under a line of 
Supreme Court doctrine concerning indigent criminal defendants—doctrine that the EBS 
literature completely ignores.  In fact, the Court has specifically (and unanimously) condemned 
the notion of treating poverty as a predictor of recidivism risk in sentencing, even if there is 
statistical evidence supporting the correlation.  Finally, while other variables in the instruments 
5
Starr:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING AND THE SCIENTIFIC RATIONALIZATION OF DISCRIMINATION 
	   3	  
(such as age and marital status) are subject only to rational basis review under current doctrine, I 
also argue that they raise substantial normative concerns.   
Contrary to the other commentators that have considered the gender discrimination issue, I 
do not think the EBS instruments can survive heightened scrutiny, nor are they justified as a 
policy matter.  There are doubtless important and even compelling state interests at stake.  But 
heightened scrutiny requires the state to prove a strong relationship to those interests, and the 
case law on wealth classifications in criminal justice also requires analysis of alternatives, as 
does sensible policymaking.  With these principles in mind, I turn to the strength of the empirical 
evidence supporting EBS.  It falls short for three principal reasons.  
First, the instruments provide nothing close to precise predictions of individual recidivism 
risk.  The underlying regression models estimate average recidivism rates for offenders sharing 
the defendant’s characteristics.  While some models have reasonably narrow confidence intervals 
for this predicted average, the uncertainty about what an individual offender will do is much 
greater.  Individual recidivism outcomes vary for many reasons that are not captured by the 
models.  While some uncertainty is inherent in predicting probabilistic future events, the risk 
prediction models also leave out many measurable variables that one might expect to be 
important—for instance, there are typically no variables relating to the crime of conviction or the 
case’s facts.  The individual prediction problem is constitutionally important because the 
Supreme Court’s cases on gender and indigent defendants have consistently held that disparate 
treatment cannot be justified based on statistical generalizations about group tendencies, even if 
they are empirically supported.  Instead, individuals must be treated as individuals.   
Second, it is not even clear that including the constitutionally problematic variables can 
substantially improve risk prediction in the aggregate.  A core EBS premise is that actuarial risk 
prediction consistently outperforms clinical predictions.  I examine the literature on which that 
claim is based, and find it unsupportive of this claim.  To be sure, meta-analyses of “clinical 
versus actuarial” comparisons in various fields have given an edge on average to the actuarial—
but not a large edge, and not a consistent one.  The specifics of the actuarial instrument matter—
one cannot say that any regression model is good by definition.  Only a few comparative studies 
actually concern recidivism, and those have had mixed results.  If anything, the studies support 
actuarial instruments that are very different from the crude ones that are actually being used—
suggesting less discriminatory alternatives that could more effectively serve the state’s 
penological interests.  Another alternative is simply to drop the constitutionally problematic 
variables, perhaps to be replaced with crime characteristics.  The empirical research gives no 
reason to believe that including these variables offers any nontrivial predictive improvement. 
Third, even if the instruments predicted individual recidivism perfectly, they do not even 
attempt to predict the thing that judges need to know to use recidivism information in a utilitarian 
sentencing calculus.  What judges need to know is not just how “risky” the defendant is in some 
absolute sense, but rather how the sentencing decision will affect his recidivism risk.  For 
example, if a judge is deciding between a one-year and a two-year prison sentence for a minor 
drug dealer, it is not very helpful to know that the defendant’s characteristics predict a “high” 
recidivism risk, absent additional information that tells the judge how much the additional year 
in prison will reduce (or increase) that risk.  Current risk prediction instruments do not provide 
that additional information.  Future research might be able to fill that gap, but it will not be easy.  
Estimating the causal relationship between sentences and recidivism is challenging, in part 
because sentencing judges take recidivism risk into account, introducing reverse causality 
6
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concerns. Some researchers have used quasi-experimental methods to tease out these causal 
pathways, but so far their estimates of incarceration’s effects have not been demographically and 
socioeconomically specific. 
Finally, I consider two interrelated counterarguments that defend EBS essentially by saying 
that it doesn’t do much.  The first is the claim that the instruments are innocuous because they do 
not directly specify a resulting sentence.  Rather, they merely provide information—and what 
kind of obscurant would prefer sentencing to be ill-informed?  This argument is not persuasive.  
The EBS instruments are meant to be used by judges, and to the extent they are used, they will 
systematically, and by design, produce disparate sentences across groups.   The fact that the 
instruments do not exclusively determine the sentence might help in a “narrow tailoring” inquiry, 
but it is not enough alone to establish their constitutionality, nor their desirability. 
The second counterargument might be labeled the “So what else is new?” defense.   Risk 
prediction has always been central to sentencing, implicating its incapacitation, rehabilitation, 
and specific deterrence objectives.  EBS advocates thus often argue that judges will inevitably 
predict risk, and may well rely on demographic and socioeconomic factors, even if they do not 
say so expressly.  The instruments, on this view, are merely there to improve this assessment’s 
accuracy.  I argue, however, that EBS is not likely merely to replace one form of risk prediction 
with another.  Rather, it will probably place a thumb on the sentencing scale in favor of more 
judicial emphasis on recidivism prevention relative to other sentencing goals.  In many contexts, 
judges and other decision-makers tend to defer to “expert” assessments, especially with respect 
to scientific methods that they do not really understand.  Moreover, providing risk predictions 
may simply increase the salience of crime prevention in judges’ minds.  
On this point, I also provide some new empirical evidence, based on a small experimental 
study that presented subjects with two fact patterns involving slight variations on the same crime.  
The two defendants varied sharply on several dimensions considered by risk prediction 
instruments.  All subjects were presented with both scenarios and asked to recommend 
sentences; the experimental variation was that half the subjects were also presented with 
actuarial risk prediction scores.  The effects of providing the scores were statistically significant 
and large.  Subjects who did not receive the scores tended to give higher sentences to the lower-
risk defendant, apparently focusing on small differences in the fact pattern that rendered that 
defendant more morally culpable.  This pattern reversed when subjects received the scores, 
suggesting that the scores encouraged them to emphasize recidivism risk over moral desert.  
These results are tentative; judges in real cases might act differently.  But the experiment adds to 
the existing empirical evidence that decision-making is affected by quantification and claims of 
scientific rigor.  
Part I of this Article introduces the EBS instruments, describes their rise, and reviews the 
literature.  Part II sets forth the disparity concern and makes the case for heightened 
constitutional scrutiny, and Part III applies that scrutiny to the empirical evidence underlying 
EBS.  Part IV considers the above-described counterarguments.  Finally, I offer some 
conclusions.  Ultimately, in my view, the equality concerns are so serious that aggravating 
sentences on the basis of demographics and poverty would be bad policy even if the instruments 
advanced the state’s interests far more substantially than they do.  Likewise, the Supreme Court’s 
case law on statistical discrimination may simply preclude deeming people dangerous on the 
basis of gender or poverty even if those generalizations were sufficiently well-supported that 
doing so would advance important state interests.   But the fact that the instruments, and the use 
7
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of the problematic variables therein, do not advance those interests strongly (if at all) means that 
there is no defense of them available.  This approach does not satisfy heightened constitutional 
scrutiny, and courts and policymakers should not embrace it. 
I. Actuarial Risk Prediction and the Movement Toward Evidence-Based Sentencing 
“Evidence-based sentencing” (EBS) refers to the use of actuarial risk prediction 
instruments to guide the judge’s sentencing decision.  The instruments are based on past 
regression analyses of the relationships between various offender characteristics and recidivism 
rates. Criminologists have developed a wide range of such instruments.4  All incorporate 
criminal history variables, such as number of past convictions, past incarceration sentences, and 
number of violent or drug convictions.5  Surprisingly, almost none include the crime of 
conviction in the case at hand.  A few include very basic information such as whether it was a 
drug crime or a violent crime; others include no crime information.6 
 Most of the instruments include gender, age, and employment status; many also include 
education, and some include composite socioeconomic variables like “financial status.”7  
Although risk prediction instruments used by some parole boards included race until as late as 
the 1970s, the modern EBS instruments overwhelmingly do not.  One exception is a “sentencing 
support” software program promoted by an Oregon state judge, Michael Marcus,8 but this not 
been formally adopted by any state.   There appears to be a general consensus that using race 
would be unconstitutional.  In 2000, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a capital case to 
consider whether “a defendant’s race or ethnic background may ever be used as an aggravating 
circumstance”; the issue was not a judicial sentencing instrument, but problematic testimony by a 
prosecution expert.9  Before oral argument, the State of Texas conceded error and granted a new 
sentencing hearing, mooting the case.10 
 Most instruments now in sentencing use are limited to fairly objective factors, such as 
demographics, employment status, and criminal history.11  But others include much more 
abstract, conceptual variables, which are meant to be coded by experienced evaluators.  For 
instance, the Indiana Supreme Court in 2010 upheld against a state law challenge, and endorsed 
enthusiastically, use in sentencing of the Level of Services Inventory-Revised (LSI-R), which is 
also used by at least eight states elsewhere in the corrections process.12 In addition to objective 
factors, the instrument also requires “subjective evaluations on … performance and interactions 
at work, family and marital situation, accommodations stability and the level of crime in the 
neighborhood, participation in organized recreational activities and use of time, nature and extent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-Based Sentencing, 64 
S.M.U. L. REV. 1329, 1399 (2011) (listing variables in 19 different instruments); Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 571-73. 
5 See Oleson, supra. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 See Draft MPC § 6B.09, cmt. (i) (discussing and criticizing this system); Michael H. Marcus, Conversations on 
Evidence Based Sentencing, 1 CHAP. J. CRIM. JUST. 61 (2009). 
9 See Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (describing the case’s history); Monahan, A 
Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 392-93 (2006). 
10 Monahan, supra, at 393. 
11 Oleson, supra. 
12 See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 
78-84 (2007) (describing the LSI-R’s uses). 
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of social involvement with companions, extent of alcohol or drug problems, 
emotional/psychological status, and personal attitudes.13 
The instruments are mechanical: each possible value of each variable corresponds to a 
particular increase or reduction in the risk estimate in every case.  The variables’ weights are not 
determined based on each case’s circumstances—for instance, men will always receive higher 
risk scores than otherwise-identical women (because, averaged across all cases, men have higher 
recidivism rates), even if the context is one in which men and women tend to have similar 
recidivism risks or in which women have higher risks.14  This is a feature of the simple 
underlying regression models, which generally have no interaction terms.  Moreover, in practice 
the instruments use even simpler point systems, in which the “high risk” answer to a yes-or-no 
question results in a point or two being added to the defendant’s score, based only quite loosely 
on the underlying regression.15 
Demographic variables and socioeconomic variables receive substantial weight.  For 
instance, in Missouri, presentence reports include a score for each defendant on a scale from -8 
to 7, where “4-7 is rated ‘good,’ 2-3 is ‘above average,’ 0-1 is ‘average’, -1 to -2 is ‘below 
average,’ and -3 to -8 is ‘poor.’”16  Unlike most instruments in use, Missouri’s does not include 
gender.  However, an unemployed high school dropout will score three points worse than an 
employed high school graduate—potentially making the difference between “good” and 
“average,” or between “average” and “poor.”17  Likewise, a defendant under age 22 will score 
three points worse than a defendant over 45.18  By comparison, having previously served time in 
prison is worth one point; having four or more prior misdemeanor convictions that resulted in jail 
time adds one point (three or fewer adds none); having previously had parole or probation 
revoked is worth one point; and a prison escape is worth one point.19  Meanwhile, current crime 
type and severity receive no weight. 
 Recidivism risk prediction instruments have been developed in various forms by 
criminologists over nearly a century,20 and their use in parole determinations dates back decades, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 572. 
14 For instance, medical studies suggest that women are on average more vulnerable to addiction and relapse than 
men are, so it may be that for some drug crimes women are more likely to recidivate.  See, e.g., Jill B. Becker & 
Ming Hu, Sex Differences in Drug Abuse, 29 FRONT NEUROENDOCRINOL 36 (2008).  Recidivism studies do not 
break down gender effects like this, however. 
15 The point additions are at best crude roundings of regression coefficients.  Moreover, the instrument does not 
track the regression’s functional form.  The underlying studies typically use logistic regression models, in which the 
coefficients translate nonlinearly into changes in probability of recidivism.  When the instruments translate the 
coefficients into fixed, additive increases on a point scale, they are “linearizing” the variables’ effects, and the 
resulting instrument will be only loosely related to the underlying nonlinear model, especially (because of the 
probability curve’s shape) for very high-risk or very low-risk cases.  
16 Michael A. Wolff, Missouri’s Information-Based Discretionary Sentencing System, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 95, 113 
(2006). 
17 Id. at 112-13. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. A defendant with every possible criminal history risk factor (four or more misdemeanors resulting in jail, two 
or more prior felonies, prior imprisonment, prior prison escape, convictions within five years, revocation of 
probation and parole, and past conviction on the same offense as the current charge) will score eight points higher 
than one with no criminal history--just two points more than the combined effect of age, employment status, and 
high school graduation.  Id. 
20 See HARCOURT, supra, at 1-2, 39-92 (reviewing this history). 
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although it has expanded sharply beginning in the 1980s.21  Their use in sentencing is newer, 
however, and other than the state-specific instruments, none were initially designed for use in 
sentencing.  For instance, the LSI-R manual specifically states that it “was never designed to 
assist in establishing the just penalty,” which did not discourage the Indiana Supreme Court from 
endorsing its use for that purpose.22  The first state to incorporate such an instrument in 
sentencing was Virginia in 1994, but the trend has taken off nationwide much more recently.  
Judge Roger Warren, the President Emeritus of the National Center for State Courts, argues that 
two developments in 2007 catalyzed this acceleration: a formal resolution of the Conference of 
Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court Administrators23 and a report by the NCSC, the 
Crime and Justice Institute, and the National Institute of Corrections.24  Another factor may be 
the recent shift toward discretionary sentencing after Blakely v. Washington and United States v. 
Booker.  Tight sentencing guidelines leave little room for considering the defendant’s individual 
risk, but in discretionary systems, judges are expected to assess it.25   
Whatever the reasons, in recent years increasing number of states have followed 
Virginia’s lead.26   In fact, Douglas Berman states that “[i]n some form, nearly every state in the 
nation has adopted, or at least been seriously considering how to incorporate, evidence-based 
research and alternatives to imprisonment into their sentencing policies and practices.”27   EBS 
has many enthusiastic advocates in academia,28 the judiciary and sentencing commissions,29 and 
think tanks and advocacy organizations.30  The National Center on State Courts has advocated 
using risk instruments to guide decision-making at all process stages, including training 
prosecutors and defense counsel to identify high- and low-risk offenders and thereby shaping 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Id. at 9, 77-80. 
22 Malenchik, 928 N.E.2d at 572-73. 
23 Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of State Court Administrators, Resolution 12 in Support of 
Sentencing Practices that Promote Public Safety and Reduce Recidivism, August 1, 2007; see Roger K. Warren, 
Evidence-Based Setencing: Are We Up to the Task?, 23 FED. SENT. R. 153, 153 (2010). 
24 Nat’l Inst. Of Corr. and Crime & Justice Inst, Evidence-Based Practice to Reduce Recidivism (2007). 
25 See Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 53 EMORY L.J. 377 (2005). 
26 Warren, supra, usefully reviews national and state policies promoting EBS. 
27 Douglas A. Berman, Editor’s Observations: Are Costs a Unique (and Uniquely Problematic) Kind of Sentencing 
Data?, 24 FED. SENT. R. 159 (2012). 
28 E.g., Jordan M. Hyatt, Mark H. Bergstrom, & Steven Chanenson, Follow the Evidence: Integrate Risk Assessment 
into Sentencing, 23 FED. SENT. R. 266 (2011); Lynn S. Branham, Follow the Leader: The Advisability and Propriety 
of Considering Cost and Recidivism Data at Sentencing, 24 FED. SENT. R. 169 (2012; Richard E. Redding, 
Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Science of Sentencing Policy and Practice, 1 CHAP. J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 1 & n.4 
(reviewing articles praising EBS, and stating that failure to employ EBS “constitutes sentencing malpractice and 
professional incompetence”). 
29 E.g., Marcus, supra; Warren, supra; Justice Michael Wolff (Chair, Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission), 
Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1389 (2008); Chief Justice William Ray Price, State of the Judiciary Address, Feb. 3, 2010, available at 
http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=36875; Mark H. Bergstrom (Pa. Commission on Sentencing) & Richard P. 
Kern (Va. Criminal Sentencing Commission), A View from the Field: Practitioner’s Response to “Actuarial 
Sentencing: An ‘Unsettled’ Proposition, 25 FED. SENT. R. 185 (2013). 
30 E.g., Pamela M. Casey, Roger K. Warren, & Jennifer K. Elek, USING OFFENDER RISK AND NEEDS INFORMATION 
AT SENTENCING 14 (Nat’l Ctr for State Courts 2011); PEW Ctr. on the States, Arming the Courts with Research: 10 
Evidence-Based Sentencing Initiatives to Control Crime and Reduce Costs, 8 Pub. Safety Policy Brief 2-3 (2009); 
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING TO IMPROVE PUBLIC SAFETY AND REDUCE 
RECIDIVISM: A MODEL CURRICULUM FOR JUDGES (2009); Matthew Kleiman, Using Evidence-Based Practices in 
Sentencing Criminal Offenders, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES (Council of State Gov’ts 2012). 
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plea-bargaining decisions.31  Other academics have offered more cautious takes, but have 
ultimately offered qualified endorsements.32 
 The new Model Penal Code, currently undergoing its first revision since its adoption in 
1962, embraces this new movement.  This is a serious development, both because it reflects an 
emerging academic consensus and because of the MPC’s influence.  The original MPC was “one 
of the most successful law reform projects in American history,” producing “revised, modernized 
penal codes in a substantial majority of the states.”33  Section 6B.09 of the new Code not only 
endorses use of “actuarial instruments or processes, supported by current and ongoing recidivism 
recidivism, that will estimate the relative risks that individual offenders pose to public safety,” 
but also their formal incorporation into presumptive sentencing guidelines.34	  	  It	  also provides that 
when particularly low-risk offenders can be identified, otherwise-mandatory minimum sentences 
should be waived.35 While parts of the revision are still being drafted, the American Law 
Institute has already approved Section 6B.09.36	  
 The official Commentary to the MPC revision illustrates the core argument for EBS: 
recidivism risk prediction is inevitably part of sentencing, and should be guided by the best 
available scientific research: 
Responsible actors in every sentencing system—from prosecutors to judges to parole 
officials—make daily judgments about…the risks of recidivism posed by offenders.  
These judgments, pervasive as they are, are notoriously imperfect.  They often derive 
from the intuitions and abilities of individual decisionmakers, who typically lack 
professional training in the sciences of human behavior. …. Actuarial—or statistical—
predictions of risk, derived from objective criteria, have been found superior to clinical 
predictions built on the professional training, experience, and judgment of the persons 
making predictions.37  
 Most EBS advocates frame it as a strategy for reducing incarceration and its budgetary 
costs and social harms.38 These advocates argue, or assume, that the prediction instruments will 
primarily allow judges to identify low-risk offenders whose sentences can be reduced, not high-
risk offenders whose sentences must be increased.  Some suggest that, absent scientific 
information on risk, judges probably already err on the side of longer sentences.39  Others 
suggest that the instruments should categorically only be used in mitigation.40 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Casey et al., supra, at 23-26. 
32 E.g., Margareth Etienne, Legal and Practical Implications of Evidence-Based Sentencing by Judges, 1 CHAPMAN 
J. CRIM. JUST. 43 (2009). 
33 Gerald Lynch, Revising the Model Penal Code: Keeping It Real, 1 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 219, 220 (2003) (also 
observing that the Code’s classroom use makes it “the document through which most American lawyers come to 
understand criminal law”). 
34 Draft MPC § 6B.09 (2). 
35 Id. at § 6B.09 (2). 
36 See id. at 133. 
37 Draft MPC, § 6B.09(2), cmt. (a).  See also, e.g., Wolff, supra, at 1406 (emphasizing superiority of actuarial 
prediction). 
38 E.g., Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Using Offender Risk and Needs Assessment Information at Sentencing 2-3 
(2011); Price, supra (citing EBS as a way to “move from anger-based sentencing” toward reduced incarceration); 
Wolff, supra, at 1390; PEW Ctr. on the States, supra, at 1; Michael Marcus, MPC—The Root of the Problem: Just 
Deserts and Risk Assessment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 751, 751 (2009). 
39 E.g., Bonta, supra, at 524. 
40 E.g., Etienne, supra. 
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In this spirit, the draft MPC Commentary asserts that “Section 6B.09 takes an attitude of 
skepticism and restraint concerning the use of high-risk predictions as a basis of elongated prison 
terms, while advocating the use of low-risk predictions as grounds for diverting otherwise 
prison-bound offenders to less onerous penalties.”  However, despite this “attitude,” the actual 
content of Section 6B.09 endorses incorporation of risk assessment procedures into sentencing 
guidelines, including for the purpose of increasing sentences.  The Commentary expresses hope 
that moving risk instruments from parole (the MPC would abolish parole) to sentencing will 
effectively constrain their “incapacitative” use, because access to counsel and greater 
transparency at sentencing would allow the defendant a chance to argue his case.41  But the 
Commentary never explains how these procedural protections will ameliorate the instruments’ 
substantive consequences for defendants whose objective characteristics render them “high risk.”  
Even the best counsel will have trouble contesting the defendant’s age, gender, education level, 
employment status, and past criminal convictions.42  Moreover, if state legislatures adopt Section 
6B.09 but not the MPC’s recommendations concerning abolition of parole, the claim that parole-
stage use is worse would be irrelevant. 
Although most of the EBS literature is positive, or even celebratory, a few scholars have 
criticized it.  The most thorough critique of risk prediction in criminal justice more broadly has 
come from Bernard Harcourt in his book AGAINST PREDICTION.43  Some of Harcourt’s arguments 
center on law enforcement profiling, but others apply to sentencing and parole.  In particular, he 
argues that prediction instruments contravene punishment theory, because punishment turns on 
who the defendant is (and what he is therefore expected to do in the future), rather than just what 
he has done.44  Although Harcourt’s book primarily focuses on actuarial risk prediction, his 
theoretical objection is applicable to clinical prediction too—he seeks to “make criminal justice 
determinations blind to predictions of future dangerousness.”45  Likewise, advocates of purely 
retributive punishment have always held that a defendant’s future risk is morally irrelevant to the 
state’s justification for punishment.46  Indeed, beyond mere irrelevance, there may be direct 
conflict (raising practical dilemmas for defense counsel): some factors that heighten a 
defendant’s predicted recidivism risk, from young age to mental illness to socioeconomic 
disadvantage, are frequently considered mitigating factors from a retributive perspective.47 
Other commentary on EBS has raised similar theoretical objections.48 John Monahan, 
while advocating actuarial prediction in other contexts (such as civil commitment), has argued 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Id. 
42 Because the MPC draft advocates mandatory sentencing guidelines, it points out that the Sixth Amendment would 
require aggravating factors (but not mitigating factors) to be found by juries.  Id. cmt. (e).  This constraint, if 
anything, seems likely to discourage states from including difficult-to-prove dynamic factors like “antisocial 
attitudes” in the instruments. For factors like gender, age, and employment, the jury trial requirement seems 
essentially irrelevant. 
43 HARCOURT, supra note 12. 
44 Id. at 31-34, 188-89.  Another of Harcourt’s arguments is discussed below in Part III.C. 
45 Id. at 5; see id. at 237-38 (arguing that clinical judgment is just as vulnerable to his critique); Yoav Sapir, Against 
Prevention?  A Response to Harcourt’s Against Prediction on Actuarial and Clinical Predictions and the Faults of 
Incapacitation, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 253, 258-61 (2008) (arguing that the problem with the instruments is really 
a broader problem with incapacitation as a punishment objective, including via clinical judgment). 
46 E.g., Paul Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 
HARVARD L. REV. 1429 (2001). 
47 E.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (explaining mitigating role of young age). 
48 See Oleson, supra, at 1388-92 (reviewing literature). 
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against the current instruments’ use in sentencing.49  His view is that, while recidivism risk may 
be a legitimate sentencing consideration, blameworthiness is nonetheless the central question, 
and thus the only risk factors that should be considered are those that also bear on the 
defendant’s moral culpability: past and present criminal conduct.50 Some critics protest the 
probabilistic nature of risk prediction, ensuring “false positives” when those deemed high-risk do 
not, in fact, recidivate.51  Others draw an unfavorable analogy to the science fiction movie 
“Minority Report,” in which the government punishes “pre-crime,” suggesting that even if the 
future could be known with certainty, punishing people for future acts is fundamentally unfair.52  
Many commentators raise such criticisms but do not treat them as dispositive, but merely as 
cautionary notes.53  For others, like Harcourt, they are more fundamental flaws.  
I do not seek to answer foundational sentencing-philosophy questions here.  I accept EBS 
advocates’ premise that recidivism prevention will inevitably play at least some role in the 
sentencing process in many cases (although I argue below that adoption of actuarial instruments 
will probably increase this role).  The Supreme Court has affirmed the relevance of recidivism 
risk to sentencing, for example permitting judges to hear expert testimony concerning the 
defendant’s dangerousness.54   
Instead, this Article’s central question is about discrimination and disparity: whether risk 
prediction instruments that classify defendants by demographic, socioeconomic, and family 
characteristics can be constitutionally or normatively justified.  One could, after all, predict risk 
in other ways—for instance, based only on past or present criminal behavior, or based on 
individual assessment of a defendant’s conduct, mental states, and attitudes.  Current literature’s 
treatment of the disparity concern is surprisingly limited; the MPC Commentary, for instance, 
barely mentions it.  Among scholars who do raise the issue, most treat it as a policy concern, 
rather than (also) a constitutional one.  For example, Harcourt, addressing the instruments’ use in 
early release decisions, has argued that “risk is a proxy for race,” observing that the instruments 
give heavy weight to criminal history, which is highly correlated with race.55  He argues that this 
strategy will “unquestionably aggravate the already intolerable racial imbalance in our prison 
populations.”56 Kelly Hannah-Moffat has similarly critiqued the criminal history variables on 
grounds of racially disparate impact, and further emphasizes that criminal history may be 
influenced by past discriminatory decision-making.57 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 In the civil commitment literature, scholars have focused on whether expert testimony predicting dangerousness is 
admissible evidence, rather than on the constitutionality or desirability of a particular judicial decision-making 
process.  E.g., Alexander Scherr, Daubert and Danger: The ‘Fit’ of Expert Predictions in Civil Commitments, 55 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5-28 (2003) (reviewing case law and literature).   I do not focus on the evidence law issues here.   
50 Monahan, supra, at 427-28. 
51 The MPC Commentary raises, but ultimately is unswayed by, this objection; see infra note 62 and accompanying 
text.  
52 E.g., Oleson, supra, at 1390; Etienne, supra, at 59; Peter Moskos, Book Review, Against Prediction, 113 AM. J. 
SOCIOLOGY 1475, 1477 (2008). 
53 E.g., Oleson, supra, at 1397-98 (concluding simply that EBS “raises excruciatingly difficult questions” and that 
“judges and jurists must determine” how to answer them). 
54 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (holding that “prediction of 
future criminal conduct is an essential element in many” criminal justice-related decisions).  
55 Bernard Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race, CRIM. & PUBLIC POL’Y (forthcoming), draft available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/535-323-bh-race.pdf. 
56 Id. 
57 Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing: An ‘Unsettled’ Proposition, at 17, available at 
http://www.albany.edu/scj/documents/Hannah-Moffatt_RiskAssessment.pdf. 
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The existing constitutional analyses, meanwhile, have focused on gender (and the 
hypothetical use of race), and have been limited in their doctrinal analysis.58  The most extensive 
such analysis, by J.C. Oleson, concludes that the instruments survive even strict scrutiny.59  
Similarly, Monahan, while opposing use of demographic variables in sentencing on punishment-
theory grounds, defends the constitutionality of their use in civil commitment, arguing that only 
race and gender raise constitutional issues at all, and that gender survives intermediate scrutiny 
because the gender differences are real and the state interests are substantial.60 
In my view, the existing literature has seriously understated both the breadth and the gravity 
of the constitutional concern.   There is a strong case that most or all of the risk prediction 
instruments now in use are unconstitutional, and current literature has not made that case or even 
seriously examined it.  I seek to fill that gap, comprehensively analyzing the relevant case law 
and empirical research.  I show both that the use of gender cannot be defended on the statistical 
bases that other authors have offered and that the problem goes well beyond gender—the 
socioeconomic variables, at least, should also receive heightened constitutional scrutiny.  And if 
such scrutiny is applied, the empirical evidence is not currently strong enough to sustain the 
instruments, and it likely never will be.    
In the criminological literature on the instruments, there is considerable debate over issues of 
reliability, validity, and precision.  Current EBS scholarship often notes these concerns but 
ultimately advocates the instruments’ use anyway.61  The MPC Commentary is a striking 
example.  It states that “error rates when projecting that a particular person will engage in serious 
criminality in the future are notoriously high” and that “most projections of future violence are 
wrong in significant numbers of cases,” and yet concludes: 
Although the problem of false positives is an enormous concern—almost paralyzing in its 
human costs—it cannot rule out, on moral or policy grounds, all use of projections of 
high risk in the sentencing process.  If prediction technology shown to be reasonably 
accurate is not employed, and crime-preventive terms of confinement are not imposed, 
the justice system knowingly permits victimizations in the community that could have 
been avoided.62 
In my view, for all their apparent agonizing, the MPC drafters and other EBS advocates are 
missing the legal import of the methodological concerns: If the instruments don’t work well, 
their use in sentencing is almost surely unconstitutional, and terribly unwise as well.  As I show 
in Part II, the Supreme Court has warned against disparate treatment based on generalizations 
about (at least) gender and poverty, even if the generalizations have statistical support.  If the 
statistical support is shoddy, there is simply no defending them. 
It is curious that the EBS literature has not taken the constitutional concern more 
seriously.  EBS scholars have occasionally asserted that actuarial prediction is obviously 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 E.g., Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment and Risk Management in Juvenile Justice, 27-WTR CRIM. JUST. 10, 
13-14 (2013); Pari McGarraugh, Note, Up or Out: Why “Sufficiently Reliable” Statistical Risk Assessment is 
Appropriate at Sentencing and Inappropriate at Parole, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1079, 1102 (2013). 
59 Oleson, supra, at 1388-92; see also Slobogin, supra, at 13-14 (briefly stating that gender discrimination probably 
survives intermediate scrutiny). 
60 Monahan, supra, at 429-432. 
61 E.g., Slobogin, supra, at 16-17; McGarraugh, supra, at 1105-07; see also Hannah-Moffat, supra (raising various 
concerns but reaching an ambivalent conclusion: “Arguably, we should pause to reflect on the complexities of risk-
needs assessments and concordant calls for and against evidence-based risk jurisprudence.”).   
62 MPC Draft §6B.09, cmt. (e).   
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constitutional because the Supreme Court has approved, against a due process challenge, 
admission of even-less-reliable expert clinical predictions of risk in sentencing proceedings.63  
This assertion is wrong.  The equal protection issue is not presented in those cases, and in 
general is not presented by individualized clinical assessments of risk per se; it is presented by 
punishment of group membership, which is explicit in the actuarial instruments. And even 
assuming actuarial predictions are more accurate than clinical ones, a question to which I return 
in Part III, the fact that evidence is reliable enough to be admissible does not mean that it 
establishes a strong enough relationship to an important government interest to withstand 
heightened scrutiny.64   In the next Part, I show that such scrutiny applies.  
II.  The Disparate Treatment Concern 
The most distinctive feature of EBS is that it formally incorporates discrimination based 
on socioeconomic status and demographic categories into sentencing.  In this Part, I set forth the 
basic constitutional and policy objections to this practice. I begin with the constitutionality of 
gender-based sentencing in Section A (setting aside race because the current instruments do not 
include it).65 Although it is uncontroversial that gender classifications are subject to heightened 
scrutiny, I examine the gender case law in some detail because it illuminates a core feature of the 
Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence that will make it very hard for EBS to survive 
heightened scrutiny: otherwise-unconstitutional discrimination cannot be justified by statistical 
generalizations about groups, even if the generalizations have empirical support.  In Section B, I 
show that that the constitutional concern goes beyond gender: a form of heightened scrutiny (and 
a similar prohibition on group generalizations) also applies to socioeconomic discrimination in 
the criminal justice context.  And in Section C, I articulate reasons policymakers should take the 
disparity concern seriously even if courts were to sustain EBS against constitutional challenges.   
This Part does not complete either the constitutional or the normative analysis; rather, it 
establishes the seriousness of the disparity concern and the resulting need at least for a very 
strong empirical justification for EBS.  In Part III, I address whether such a justification exists. 
Note that I frame my constitutional argument within existing doctrine, and thus do not 
argue for heightened scrutiny of certain other variables in the model—for instance, age and 
marital status are routine government classifications that are subject to rational basis review.  
There is, however, a plausible broader argument for strict scrutiny of group-based sentencing 
discrimination more generally, grounded in the “fundamental rights” branch of equal protection 
jurisprudence rather than the “suspect classifications” branch.  Incarceration, after all, profoundly 
interferes with virtually every right the Supreme Court has deemed fundamental, and EBS makes 
these rights interferences turn on identity rather than criminal conduct.  Although I would be 
happy to see the Supreme Court adopt such an approach, it is presently foreclosed to lower 
courts by language the Court used in a case called Chapman v. United States, and I do not focus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 E.g., Slobogin, supra, at 15; Steven J. Morse, Mental Disorders and Criminal Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 885, 944 (2011); see Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
64 In Barefoot, the Court made clear that the defects in evidence would have to be extreme before their admission 
would be barred by the Due Process Clause on the grounds of sheer unreliability. 463 U.S. at 898-99. 
65 The instruments do include socioeconomic variables that are highly correlated with race, a point I return to in § C, 
but they would be hard to challenge constitutionally on that basis.  The Supreme Court has consistently held that 
absent a racially disparate purpose, policies that are facially neutral as to race cannot be challenged merely on the 
grounds of a racially disparate impact.  E.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).  
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on it.66  Certain variables used in some models might also merit new recognition as quasi-
suspect—particularly variables relating to an offender’s family background or family members’ 
criminal history, which are closely analogous to illegitimacy, a quasi-suspect classification—but 
again, I do not rely on this possibility.67  The policy critique in Section C thus applies more 
broadly, to more variables, than the constitutional arguments in Sections A and B do.  
A. Gender Classifications and the Problem with Statistical Discrimination  
Virtually every risk prediction instrument in use incorporates gender.  Because the 
coefficient on gender is the same for all defendants, every single male defendant will, due to 
gender alone, be assigned a higher risk score than an otherwise-identical woman.  Gender 
classifications are subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny, requiring an “exceedingly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 464-65 (1991).   In Chapman, the defendant challenged the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines’ method of calculating LSD weight, which included the carrier medium; the claim was that 
this method created unfair distinctions between people who carried the same amount of actual LSD.   The Court 
rejected the notion that fundamental rights analysis should apply to sentencing distinctions within the statutory 
sentencing range, reasoning that once convicted, the offender no longer has a fundamental right to any sentence 
below the statutory maximum.  Note that this holding does not preclude a challenge to a sentencing decision based 
on the nature of the classification; it speaks only to the “fundamental rights” branch.  As I show below, both gender 
and poverty-based discrimination have triggered successful challenges to sentences within the statutory range. 
 Although Chapman’s holding is not entirely surprising (the Court in general is quite reluctant to apply 
constitutional scrutiny to sentences, see Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional 
Rights at Sentencing, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 47, 49 (2011), and presumably worried that doing so in that case would require 
the extension of strict scrutiny to virtually every sentencing distinction), its reasoning, in my view, fails to take 
seriously the tremendous stakes of sentencing choices within statutory ranges.    Those ranges are often very broad 
(say, zero to 20 years), and it is hard to imagine any government decision that would have a more drastic impact on 
a defendant’s exercise of fundamental liberties than the choice between, say, 5 and 20 years’ incarceration.   
Moreover, the Court’s characterization of the right at issue was unduly narrow; the question is not whether the 
defendant had a right to a sentence below the statutory maximum.  Rather, underlying, clearly established 
fundamental rights are being taken away (including the defendant’s most basic physical liberty, which is directly and 
deliberately retracted by the incarceration decision, plus iadditional rights as procreation, communication, and 
voting).  Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (critiquing the Court’s past, overly narrow 
characterization of the right to sexual intimacy as a “right to homosexual sodomy”).   
The outcome in Chapman is perfectly defensible, but it could have been reached with a different rationale.  
The drug-weighting rule was a classification of criminal conduct, not persons, and thus (absent evidence of some 
discriminatory motive) raised no equal protection concern at all; all persons are prospectively subject to the same 
weighting rules, and have an equal chance to conduct their activities to avoid the rule.  Applying fundamental rights 
analysis to EBS thus would not imply that routine sentencing distinctions between crimes are also subject to strict 
scrutiny.  One could likewise defend sentencing distinctions based on criminal history as also being conduct-based 
and universally applicable—all persons who commit crimes are subjecting themselves to potential higher sentences 
for subsequent crimes.  But when the state systematically gives different sentences to different groups of people for 
the same crime, with the same past criminal conduct, the Constitution should demand a compelling justification. 
67 Such variables are outside the defendant’s control, unchangeable, generally unrelated to legitimate state policy, 
and often—especially in the case of familial incarceration or time in foster care—the basis for considerable social 
stigma and disadvantage.  See Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional 
Framework for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions for People With Criminal Records, 7 J. L. Society 18, 51 
(2005) (reviewing case law and identifying factors that often trigger heightened scruting); John Hagan & Ronit 
Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for Children, Communities, and Prisoners, 26 CRIME & JUST. 
121 (1999) (reviewing literature on effects of parental incarceration); United States v. Sprei, 145 F.3d 528, 535 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (describing stigma and reduced marital prospects as an “inevitable result” of a parent’s incarceration); 
Daniel Pollack et. al., Foster Care as a Mitigating Circumstance in Criminal Proceedings, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 43, 59 (2012) (quoting Sandra Stukes Chipungu & Tricia B. Bent-Goodley, Meeting the Challenges of 
Contemporary Foster Care, 14 FUTURE CHILD. 75, 85 (2004)). 
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persuasive justification”—that is, the state must prove “that the classification serves important 
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to 
the achievement of those objectives.”68  Given this well-established doctrine, one might have 
thought that gender’s inclusion in the instruments would have occasioned considerable concern 
and debate.  And yet most scholarship ignores this concern, or else briefly asserts that the state’s 
interests are important.69  The draft Model Penal Code recommends excluding race, and the 
Commentary notes that sentencing based on race would be unconstitutional.70 And yet the MPC 
drafters recommend including gender, and offer no commentary defending this on constitutional 
grounds, as though its constitutionality is self-evident.71  
In the rare cases in which the issue has been presented, modern courts have consistently 
held (outside the EBS context) that it is unconstitutional to base sentences on gender.72  There is, 
to be sure, considerable statistical research suggesting that judges (and prosecutors) do on 
average treat women defendants more leniently than men.73 But it is virtually unheard of for 
modern judges to say that they are taking gender into account,74 and demonstrating gender bias 
would usually be challenging.  Before the past few decades, explicit consideration of gender as 
well as race was common, but few today defend that practice.75   The U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines, for example, expressly forbid the consideration of both race and sex.76  Outside the 
literature on EBS, scholars have likewise mostly treated the gender gap as “unwarranted” 
sentencing disparity.77 
Given this widespread consensus against sentencing based on gender, there is a certain 
surreal quality to the EBS literature’s mostly untroubled embrace of it.  The justification offered 
(if any) is that women in fact pose substantially lower recidivism risk than men do.78   Some 
scholars add that to fail to account for this fact is unfair to women, essentially punishing them for 
men’s recidivism risk.79  More generally (referring to “gender, ethnicity, age, and disability”), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
69 E.g., Slobogin, supra, at 14.  McGarraugh, supra at 1102, states that gender should be removed from the 
instruments to preserve their constitutionality, but does not develop the legal reasoning for this point. 
70 Draft MPC, supra, Sec 6B.09 cmt. (i). 
71 Id. 
72 Carissa Byrne Hessick, Race and Gender as Explicit Sentencing Factors, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 127, 137 
(2010); United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985, 989 (4th Cir. 1974); Williams v. Currie, 103 F. Supp. 2d 858, 868 
(M.D.N.C. 2000). 
73 E.g., Sonja B. Starr, Estimating Gender Disparities in Federal Criminal Cases (under review) (2013) (finding 
large gender gaps at multiple procedural stages that are unexplained by observable variables, and also reviewing 
other studies).  
74 Hessick, supra, at 128. 
75 Id. at 129-36. 
76 U.S.S.G. Sec 5H1.10. 
77 E.g., Oren Gazal-Ayal, A Global Perspective on Sentencing Reforms, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. I, iii-iv 
(2013); Mona Lynch, Expanding the Empirical Picture of Sentencing: An Invitation, 23 FED. SENT. R. 313 (2011). 
Some scholars criticize increasing female incarceration rates, but do not generally argue that women should receive 
lower sentences based on gender per se.  Rather, they argue that the system should take more account of certain 
mitigating factors that are more often present in female defendants’ cases.  E.g., Phyllis Goldfarb, Counting the 
Drug War’s Female Casualties, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 277, 291-93 (2002); Leslie Acoca & Myrna S. Raeder, 
Severing Family Ties: The Plight of Nonviolent Female Offenders and their Children, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
133 (1999). 
78 E.g., Monahan, supra, at 431. 
79 See Margareth Etienne, Sentencing Women: Reassessing the Claims of Disparity, 14 J. GENDER, RACE, & JUSTICE 
73, 82 (2010). 
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Judge Michael Marcus states: “We are not treating like offenders alike if we insist on ignoring 
factors that make them quite unalike in risk.”80  
But this argument, which embraces a concept of “actuarial fairness,”81 stands on unsound 
constitutional footing. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected defenses of gender 
classifications that are grounded in statistical generalizations about groups—even those with 
empirical support.   In Craig v. Boren, for instance, the Court considered a challenge to a law 
subjecting men to a higher drinking age for certain alcoholic beverages than women.  The state 
had defended the law with statistical evidence, including a study showing that young men were 
arrested for drunk driving at more than ten times the rate of young women (2% versus 0.18%).  
The Court noted observed that “prior cases have consistently rejected the use of sex as a 
decisionmaking factor even though the statutes in question certainly rested on far more 
predictive empirical relationships than this.”   That is, what is prohibited is not just “outdated 
misconceptions” and merely “hypothesized” gender differences.82  What is prohibited is inferring 
an individual tendency from group statistics. Note that the government’s argument in Craig 
could easily have been framed in “actuarial fairness” terms: arguably it would have been unfair 
to bar young women from drinking based on a drunk driving risk that came almost entirely from 
males.  But the Court’s approach to equal protection means that individuals are neither entitled to 
a favorable statistical generalization based on gender, nor subject to unfavorable ones.   
Examples of this principle abound. For instance, the Court has repeatedly held that 
government cannot base benefits policies on the assumption that wives are financially dependent 
on their husbands—even though, when the cases were decided in the 1970s, that presumption 
was usually correct.83  The Court explained that “such a gender-based generalization cannot 
suffice to justify the denigration of the efforts of women who do” support their families.84 
Likewise, the Court has struck down gender-based peremptory challenges in jury selection, 
holding that the state cannot make assumptions about jurors based on gender, “even when some 
statistical support can be conjured up.”85  And in United States v. Virginia, the Court ordered the 
Virginia Military Institute to admit women, rejecting its arguments about “typically male or 
typically female ‘tendencies.’”  The Court observed: “The United States does not challenge any 
expert witness estimation on average capacities or preferences of men and women. … It may be 
assumed, for purposes of this decision, that most women would not choose VMI's adversative 
method.”  But, the Court emphasized, the point is not what most women would choose.  “[W]e 
have cautioned reviewing courts to take a hard look at generalizations or ‘tendencies’ of the kind 
pressed by Virginia… [T]he State's great goal [of educating soldiers] is not substantially 
advanced by women's categorical exclusion, in total disregard of their individual merit, from the 
State's premier ‘citizen soldier’ corps.”86 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Marcus, supra, at 769. 
81 This is a concept that has traditionally (although subject to some limitations) dominated insurance law—the idea 
is that it is fair for insurers to tailor rates to the risks posed by particular groups, and unfair to expect groups to cross-
subsidize one another’s risks.  See, e.g., Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1597-1600 (2011).  
82 See Monahan, supra, at 432-433 (defending gender-based risk prediction for civil commitment). 
83 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S 677 (1973); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975). 
84 Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 645. 
85 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140 n.11 (1994). 
86 In City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 432 U.S. 702 (1978), the Court similarly struck down, on Title VII grounds, a 
requirement that female employees pay higher pension plan premiums because of their higher actuarial life 
expectancy.  The Court stated: 
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In short, the Supreme Court has squarely rejected “statistical discrimination”—use of 
group tendencies as a proxy for individual characteristics—as a permissible justification for 
otherwise constitutionally forbidden discrimination.  Economists often defend statistical 
discrimination as efficient, arguing that if a decision-maker lacks detailed information about an 
individual, relying on group-based averages (or even mere stereotypes, if the stereotypes have a 
grain of truth to them) will produce better decisions in the aggregate.  But the Supreme Court has 
held that this defense of gender and race discrimination offends a core value embodied by the 
equal protection clause: that people have a right to be treated as individuals.   
Individualism, indeed, is at the very heart of the Supreme Court’s equal protection case 
law.87  Many scholars have criticized this characteristic, arguing that it renders the Court’s 
jurisprudence overly formalistic and too inattentive to substantive inequalities.  On this view, the 
primary purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to dismantle group-based subordination, not to 
ensure that government will treat individuals in ways that are blind to group identity; the latter 
approach may actually undermine the former if it prevents government from recognizing and 
acting to rectify societally entrenched inequalities.88  I am sympathetic to this view myself, in 
fact, but I frame this Article within the approach that dominates current doctrine.  In any event, 
an antisubordinationist approach to equal protection law would hardly be friendlier to EBS, an 
approach that amplifies inequality in the criminal justice system’s impact by inflicting additional 
criminal punishment on the poor and, via disparate impact, on people of color.  In Section D, I 
explore further EBS’s social and distributive impacts, and explain why (even though men, in 
general, are not a subordinated class) its inclusion of gender can be expected to exacerbate this 
social impact on disadvantaged groups. 
Thus, although gender discrimination is not wholly constitutionally forbidden, EBS 
proponents are going to face tough sledding if their defense of it depends on statistical 
generalizations about men and women.  And it does—EBS is all about generalizing based on 
statistical averages, and its advocates defend it on the basis that the averages are right.  At least 
in the gender context, that probably will not convince courts.  The statistical relationship would 
at the very least have to be so strong that courts could deem the resulting individual predictions 
noticeably more sound than those the Supreme Court has rejected in the past, and could 
accordingly hold that an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the classification was present.  
But this requirement sets a high bar—in United States v. Virginia, for instance, the Court’s only 
example of sex differences that the government could (within constraints) consider was the 
irreducible physical differences between men and women.89   
Beyond gender, the Court’s emphasis on individualism and rejection of statistical 
discrimination should inform our thinking about the constitutionality of other variables as well.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
This case … involves a generalization that the parties accept as unquestionably true: Women, as a class, do 
live longer than men….It is equally true, however, that all individuals in the respective classes do not share 
the characteristic that differentiates the average class representatives.….. [Title VII] precludes treatment of 
individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class. … Even a true 
generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the 
generalization does not apply.   
Id. at 707-08; see Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 620 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing 
this passage to inform the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
87 See Richard Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 553 (2002). 
88 See id. at 554-59; Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or 
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9-10 (2004) (reviewing antisubordinationist scholarship). 
89 518 U.S. at 533. 
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To be sure, it is not always forbidden for the government to rely on statistical generalizations; it 
would be hard to imagine government functioning if it did not, since it would have to tailor every 
action it takes to every individual.  Government sometimes has to draw clear lines that may 
overgeneralize—for instance, the state sets a maximum blood-alcohol content for driving, rather 
than requiring each individual’s fitness to drive to be individually assessed.  Frederick Schauer 
has made this point forcefully, offering a fairly broad defense of reliance on statistically 
supported generalizations.90   But as Schauer emphasizes, this practice properly has limits—
certain kinds of generalizations (including those based on gender) are particularly socially 
harmful, or expressively invidious, even if they have statistical support.91 The practice of 
applying more demanding equal protection scrutiny to some government classifications than to 
others is grounded in similar reasoning.  
Note that the problem with EBS could be framed either as excess generalization (failure 
to treat people as individuals whose risk varies for reasons particular to them) or as insufficient 
generalization (failure to treat all those with the same criminal conduct the same way).  Schauer, 
for instance, defended the then-mandatory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and particularly their bar 
on demographic and socioeconomic considerations, along the latter lines: “Ignoring real 
differences in sentencing -- sentencing socially beneficial heart surgeons to the same period of 
imprisonment for murder as socially parasitic career criminals -- may well serve the larger 
purpose of explaining that at a moment of enormous significance … we are all in this 
together.”92  In my view, the problem with EBS cannot be simply described in terms of 
generality versus particularity; the problem is not that the instruments generalize, but that they 
employ particular kinds of generalizations that are insidious, in a context that has huge 
consequences for individuals and communities. 
B.  Wealth-Related Classifications in the Criminal Justice System 
 The constitutional problem with EBS goes beyond gender.  In this Section, I show that 
current doctrine also supports application of heightened scrutiny to variables related to 
socioeconomic status, such as employment status, education, or income.  The Supreme Court’s 
case law in other contexts has consistently held that similar wealth-related classifications are not 
constitutionally suspect,93 and perhaps this is why EBS scholars have completely ignored the 
potential constitutional concerns with these variables.  But this case law is not dispositive in the 
sentencing context.  Many criminal defendants have challenged policies and practices that 
effectively discriminate against the indigent, including discrimination in punishment.  These 
defendants have often succeeded, and the Supreme Court and lower courts have applied to their 
claims a special form of heightened constitutional scrutiny, citing intertwined equal protection 
and due process considerations. 
 The treatment of indigent criminal defendants has for more than a half-century been a 
central focus of the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence.  Indeed, the Court has 
often used very strong language concerning the importance of eradicating wealth-related 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES (2003). 
91 Id. at 38-41. 
92 Id. at 261-62.  Although I am uncomfortable with group-based sentencing distinctions, I do not favor mandatory 
sentencing, because offenses are often defined too broadly to capture real differences in criminal conduct and 
culpability.  Also, mandatory sentencing laws generally do not eliminate individualization of punishment, but shift 
the power to individualize toward prosecutors (a possibility Schauer acknowledges, id. at 256). 
93 E.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977). 
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disparities in criminal justice; in Griffin v. Illinois, for instance, it called this objective “the 
central aim of our entire judicial system.”94   Griffin struck down the requirement that defendants 
pay court costs before receiving a trial transcript, which they need to prepare an appeal.  The 
Court held that “[i]n criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than 
on account of religion, race, or color,” and that “[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of 
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”95  
Numerous other cases also stand for the principle that both equal protection and due 
process concerns require that indigent criminal defendants not be subject to special burdens.  
Principally, these cases have focused on access to the criminal process: “the belief that justice 
cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to 
participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.”96  Notably, 
these cases have applied heightened scrutiny even when the wealth-based classification did not 
deprive the defendant of something to which he otherwise would have had a substantive right—
the cases relating to appeal procedures, for instance, reiterated the then-established principle that 
a State need not provide an appeal as of right at all.  Rather, Griffin and its progeny involved a 
special “equality principle” motivated by “the evil [of] discrimination against the indigent.”97  
For this reason, a challenge to EBS need not establish that the defendant has some free-standing 
constitutional entitlement to a lower sentence than he received.   
 For our purposes, the most on-point Supreme Court case is Bearden v. Georgia, in which 
the district court had revoked the probation of an indigent defendant who had been unable to pay 
his court-ordered restitution.98  The Court unanimously reversed, holding that incarcerating a 
defendant merely because he was unable to pay amounted to unconstitutional wealth-based 
discrimination.99  Importantly, the Court in Bearden squarely rejected the state’s argument that 
poverty was a recidivism risk factor that justified additional incapacitation: 
[T]he State asserts that its interest in rehabilitating the probationer and protecting society 
requires it to remove him from the temptation of committing other crimes. This is no 
more than a naked assertion that a probationer's poverty by itself indicates he may 
commit crimes in the future. …[T]he State cannot justify incarcerating a probationer who 
has demonstrated sufficient bona fide efforts to repay his debt to society, solely by 
lumping him together with other poor persons and thereby classifying him as dangerous.  
This would be little more than punishing a person for his poverty.100 
The Court’s resistance to “lumping [the defendant] together with other poor persons” is very 
similar to its reasoning concerning statistical discrimination in the gender cases.  The Court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956). 
95 Id. at 19.  Accord Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971). 
96 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (citing the 
goal of achieving a justice system in which, regardless of finances, “every defendant stands equal before the law”). 
97 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 369-72 & nn. 2-3 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (reviewing case law); see 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-57 (1963); United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 331 (1976) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to the “Griffin equality principle”).   
98 461 U.S. 660 (1983). 
99 Id. Bearden built on Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), in which the Court had similarly reversed a 
revocation of probation for failure to pay restitution.  In Williams, the resulting incarceration sentence exceeded the 
statutory maximum for the crime, and the Court stated in dictum that absent that problem, no constitutional concern 
would have been raised.  Id. at 243   In Bearden, however, the incarceration sentence did not exceed the statutory 
maximum, and the Court nonetheless held it unconstitutional, apparently rejecting the Williams dictum. 
100 461 U.S. at 671. 
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observed that the state had cited “several empirical studies suggesting a correlation between 
poverty and crime,” but it was not persuaded by this appeal to a statistical generalization.101 
 Bearden does not establish that financial background is always irrelevant to sentencing.  
Although the Court decisively rejected the use of poverty to predict crime risk, it took more 
seriously a different defense of the provocation revocation.  The Court emphasized one reason it 
may be permissible to consider ability to pay (and related factors such as employment history) 
when choosing between incarceration and restitution sentences: 
The State, of course, has a fundamental interest in appropriately punishing persons--rich 
and poor--who violate its criminal laws. A defendant's poverty in no way immunizes him 
from punishment. Thus…the sentencing court can consider the entire background of the 
defendant, including his employment history and financial resources.102 
That is, the State may consider financial factors as necessary to ensure the poor do not avoid 
punishment—as they would if sentenced only to pay a fine or restitution that they then cannot 
pay.  But with EBS, poverty is not being considered to enable equal punishment of rich and poor, 
but to trigger extra, unequal punishment.103  The Court further held that even when probation 
revocation is necessary to ensure that the poor do not avoid punishment, it is only permitted after 
an inquiry to determine if there are viable alternatives, such as “a reduced fine or alternate public 
service…Only if the sentencing court determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not 
adequate in a particular situation to meet the State's interest in punishment and deterrence may 
the State imprison a probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay.”104 
This requirement that less restrictive alternatives be considered is a hallmark of strict 
scrutiny. However, the Court resisted expressly categorizing its analysis within any particular tier 
of scrutiny.  Indeed, reviewing the case law on indigent criminal defendants, the Court expressed 
ambivalence as to whether the key constitutional provision was really the Equal Protection 
Clause at all, as opposed to the Due Process Clause.  As the Court explained, these constitutional 
concerns are intertwined in these cases, and in any event, 
“[w]hether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue cannot be 
resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather requires a careful 
inquiry into such factors as ‘the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to 
which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative means and 
purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose ....’”105 
This language suggests an unconventional, perhaps somewhat flexible balancing test: a stronger 
legislative purpose and connection to that purpose might be required depending on the individual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Id. at 671 n.11. 
102 Id. at 669-70. 
103 See also Williams v. Illinois, 388 U.S. at 244 (stating that ability to pay can be considered to avoid “inverse 
discrimination”); United States v. Altamirano, 11 F.3d 52, 53 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing the circumstances in which 
courts can consider indigency).  A defendant, indeed, is constitutionally entitled to a judicial inquiry into her ability 
to pay a fine.  See, e.g., Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 608 (6th Cir. 2007). 
104 461 U.S. at 671-72.  Similarly, Justice White wrote that because “poverty does not insulate those who break the 
law from punishment,” the poor may be imprisoned if they cannot pay fines, but only “if the sentencing court makes 
a good-faith effort to impose a jail sentence that in terms of the state's sentencing objectives will be roughly 
equivalent to the fine and restitution that the defendant failed to pay.”  That is, the magnitude of the punishment 
must be the same, even if the means is not.  Bearden, 461 U.S. at 675 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
105 461 U.S. at 666-67; see Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (discussing the interrelationship between due 
process and equal protection concerns in these cases). 
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interest at stake and the extent to which it is effected.  But in requiring a “careful inquiry” into 
each factor, including the existence of alternatives, it is clear that the Court means to require 
some form of heightened scrutiny, considerably more assertive than mere rational basis review.  
Although Bearden involved revocation of probation, lower courts have treated it as a 
constraint on initial sentencing decisions.  For instance, the Ninth Circuit has cited Bearden to 
reverse a district court’s decision to treat inability to pay restitution as an aggravating sentencing 
factor, explaining that “the court improperly injected socioeconomic status into the sentencing 
calculus” and that “the authority forbidding such an approach is abundant and unambiguous.” 106 
Conversely, citing the same disparity concern, the Ninth Circuit has also reversed (as 
“unreasonable” under United States v. Gall) a decision to reduce a defendant’s sentence due to 
ability to pay restitution, holding:  “Rewarding defendants who are able to make restitution in 
large lump sums…perpetuates class and wealth distinctions that have no place in criminal 
sentencing.”107   Even before Bearden, several circuits had already held that equal protection 
entitles an indigent defendant who was unable to make bail to credit against the eventual 
sentence for time served, to avoid impermissible wealth-based distinctions in sentencing.108   
The Supreme Court and lower courts have recognized a divergence between the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of indigent criminal defendants and its normally deferential review of wealth-
based classifications: “legislation which has a disparate impact on the indigent defendant should 
be subject to a more searching scrutiny than requiring a mere rational relationship.”109  The 
Supreme Court itself has repeatedly noted this divergence. In United States v. Kerr, a district 
court reasoned that special scrutiny is justified by a combination of the serious stakes and the 
nature of the class:  “At stake here is not mere economic or social welfare regulations but 
deprivation of a man's liberty. The courts ‘will squint hard at any legislation that deprives an 
individual of his liberty—his right to remain free.’ Moreover, the indigent, though not a suspect 
class, have suffered unfair persecution.”110 
Outside the context of inability to pay fines and restitution, there is relatively little case 
law focusing on use of wealth classifications to determine substantive sentencing outcomes.  
This dearth should not be taken to suggest judicial approval—the issue likely rarely arises 
because the practice is rare.  The criminal justice system has been rife with procedural obstacles 
to equal treatment of the indigent, and there are no doubt many subtle or de facto ways in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 United States v. Burgum, 633 F.3d 810, 816 (9th Cir. 2011); accord United States v. Parks, 89 F.3d 570, 572 
(1996) (“[The defendant] may be receiving an additional eight months on this sentence due to poverty.  Such a result 
is surely anathema to the Constitution.”); see also United States v. Ellis, 907 F.2d 12, 13 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that 
“the government cannot keep a person in prison solely because of indigency”); but see State v. Todd, 147 Idaho 321, 
323 (2009) (upholding inability to pay as an aggravating factor). 
107 United States v. Bragg, 582 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). 
108 See, e.g., King v. Wyrick, 516 F.3d 321, 323 (8th Cir. 1975); Ham v. North Carolina, 471 F.2d 406, 407, 408 (4th 
Cir.1973); Johnson v. Prast, 548 F.2d 699, 703 (7th Cir.1977); but see Vasquez v. Cooper, 862 F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 
1988) (finding no constitutional violation because the court considered inability to pay when setting bail). 
109 U.S. v. Luster, 889 F.2d 1523 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 n.6 (1977); Kadrmas v. 
Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 461 n.*(1988) (rejecting heightened scrutiny in a non-criminal case 
because “the criminal-sentencing decision at issue in Bearden is not analogous to the user fee … before us”); 
Dickerson v. Latessa, 872 F.2d 1116, 1119-1120 (1st Cir. 1989) (observing that classifications implicating appeal 
rights receive heightened scrutiny only if they are wealth-based); United States v. Avendano-Camacho, 786 F.2d 
1392, 1394 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kennedy, J.) (same); United States v. Kerr, 686 F. Supp. 1174 (W.D. Pa. 1988).  
110 Kerr, 686 F. Supp. at 1178 (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. at 263 (Harlan, J., concurring) and citing 
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)). 
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poverty might influence the sentence.  But the practice of actually treating poverty as an 
aggravating factor in sentencing has not been prevalent (before EBS) and has been considered 
illegitimate.  For instance, the formerly mandatory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines forbid 
consideration of socioeconomic status.111  It is true that, now that the guidelines are merely 
advisory, federal courts do occasionally refer to education or employment when discussing the 
offender’s circumstances (as do state courts—in contrast to gender, which is essentially never 
cited).112  Such cases might well also be constitutionally problematic, unless such factors are 
used in service of the “equal punishment” principle discussed above; I do not focus here on the 
factors that can be considered in individualized judicial assessments of offenders.  But at least 
such cases do not necessarily reflect a generalization that unemployed or uneducated people are 
categorically more dangerous, in the mechanical way that the EBS instruments do.  Instead, the 
court can assess what each factor means in the context of a particular case—considering, for 
instance, whether the offender is making an effort to find employment or otherwise pursue 
rehabilitation, rather than simply blindly adding a given number of points based on current 
employment status or past educational attainment. 
The federal Guidelines do include an enhancement for offenders with a “criminal 
livelihood,”113 and defendants have occasionally challenged that enhancement as disparately 
affecting the poor, because the same criminal revenue would constitute a larger share of a low-
income person’s livelihood.  Soon after the guideline’s adoption, a least one district court held 
(citing Bearden) that, to avoid this potential constitutional concern, it should be interpreted to 
focus on the absolute amount of criminal income, rather than the share of total income, and the 
Sentencing Commission amended the guideline to come closer to this view.114  After the 
amendment, the Sixth Circuit upheld the new guideline against a similar challenge, holding that 
although Bearden required heightened scrutiny of sentencing burdens on the poor, the amended 
guideline appropriately targeted “professional criminals” who have “chosen crime as a 
livelihood” and that any disproportionate effect on the poor did not reflect disparate treatment, 
but rather was “an incidental effect of the statute’s objective.”115   
This rationale, however, cannot be applied to EBS, in which poverty indicators are 
themselves treated as recidivism risk factors—exactly the statistical generalization that the 
Supreme Court squarely condemned in Bearden.  As the district court put it in Kerr, even though 
Bearden recognized “a correlation between poverty and crime,…a person cannot be punished 
solely for his poverty.  As a matter of constitutional belief, the presumption that the indigent will 
act criminally ‘is too precarious for a rule of law.’”116 
It is difficult to see how the socioeconomic variables in EBS can avoid Bearden-like 
heightened scrutiny.  Unemployment and education, the most common such variables, cannot 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 U.S.S.G. 5H1.10; see also Joan Petersilia & Susan Turner, Guideline-Based Justice: Prediction and Racial 
Minorities, 9 CRIME & JUST. 151, 153-154, 160 (1987) (describing sentencing reformers’ objective of eliminating 
role of “status” factors like employment).  
112 E.g., United States v. Trimble, 2013 WL 1235510 (11th Cir. 2013). 
113 U.S.S.G. 4B1.3. 
114 United States v. Rivera, 694 F.Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y.1988); see United States v. Luster, 889 F.2d 1523 (6th Cir. 
1989) (describing the amendment).  The amended guideline’s quantitative inquiry concerns only the amount of 
criminal income; there is also a qualitative inquiry into whether crime was the defendant’s “primary occupation.” 
115 Luster, 889 F.2d at 1530. 
116 686 F. Supp. at 1179.  Cf. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (striking down a vagrancy law and holding 
that it could not be “seriously contended that because a person is without employment and without funds he 
constitutes a ‘moral pestilence’. Poverty and immorality are not synonymous.”). 
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meaningfully be distinguished from the ability to pay, nor can composite variables like “financial 
status.”  All are proxies for poverty, and the case law in the Bearden-Griffin line makes 
interchangeable references to “wealth,” “poverty,” “class,” and so forth without fine distinctions.  
For instance, the Court has always treated “ability to pay” as being equivalent to poverty, even 
though the two are not identical—ability to pay also depends on what one’s other expenses are, 
whether one can borrow money from someone, and so forth.  Bearden directly addresses, and 
limits, the circumstances under which courts can consider “employment history and financial 
resources,” specifically rejecting the consideration of such factors as recidivism predictors.117 
Indeed, the argument the Court was rejecting in that passage turned fundamentally on 
employment status; the empirical studies that Georgia had cited in Bearden to support its 
recidivism-risk argument were mainly studies of the relationship between unemployment and 
recidivism, and the state emphasized that the defendant’s recent job loss made him a higher 
recidivism risk.118 Meanwhile, the point of including education in the recidivism instrument is 
that it is a proxy for the defendant’s future prospects for employment and legitimate earnings; it 
would be hard to defend the use of this factor using logic that clearly distinguished it from past, 
present, or future poverty.   Neighborhood characteristics could potentially also be considered 
socioeconomic variables, since they are also very closely related to poverty, although this 
example is more disputable because these variables operate at a geographic level and do not 
draw distinctions among persons within the neighborhood.119    
While there are limits to the courts’ efforts to protect indigent defendants, those limits 
have been found in cases testing what affirmative assistance the state must provide in order to 
level the criminal justice playing field.  EBS, in contrast is a deliberate effort to unlevel that field.  
As with gender, its defenders will be fighting an uphill battle to overcome heightened scrutiny, 
because if, as Bearden holds, one cannot impute individual risk based on the average risk posed 
by poor defendants, the rationale for EBS disappears. 
C.  The Social Harm of Demographic and Socioeconomic Sentencing Discrimination 
EBS’s use of demographic, socioeconomic, and family-related characteristics is also 
highly troubling on public policy grounds. As noted above, EBS advocates frequently emphasize 
its potential to help reduce incarceration rates.120  But what they do not typically emphasize is 
that the mass incarceration problem in the United States is drastically disparate in its distribution.  
This unequal distribution is a core driver of its adverse social consequences, because it leaves 
certain neighborhoods and subpopulations decimated.  Black men, for instance, are 52 times as 
likely to be incarcerated as white women are.121  Young black men are especially at risk: one in 
nine black men under 35 are currently behind bars,122 and one in three will be at some point in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 461 U.S. at 671. 
118 Brief of the Respondent, Bearden v. Georgia, 1982 U.S. Sup. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 438, at 32-35. 
119 Given fairly high levels of residential segregation, see generally U.S. Census Bureau, Racial and Ethnic 
Residential Segregation in the United States: 1980-2000, available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/pdf/censr-3.pdf, neighborhood might also be a racial 
proxy, but challengers would likely have trouble proving a racially discriminatory purpose. 
120 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
121 See HEATHER C. WEST, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 
2009—STATISTICAL TABLES, 21 tbl.18 (2010).   
122 PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 3 (2008), available at 
http://www.pewstates.org/research/reports/one-in-100-85899374411. 
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their lives.123  And the concentration of incarceration’s effects is even more dramatic when one 
takes into account socioeconomic and neighborhood-level predictors. High school dropouts, for 
example, are 47 times as likely to be incarcerated as college graduates are, and young black male 
dropouts are incarcerated at a rate of approximately 22% at any given time.124  An ample 
literature documents these disparities and their effects on communities.125   
The EBS instruments produce higher risk estimates, other things equal, for the same 
subgroups that are already disproportionately incarcerated, and so it is reasonable to predict that 
EBS will exacerbate these disparities.    Although we do not know whether EBS will reduce 
incarceration on balance, the most intuitive expectation is that it will increase incarceration for 
some people (those deemed high-risk) and reduce it for others (those deemed low-risk).  If so, it 
will further concentrate mass incarceration’s impact demographically.   
This is likely to include concentrating its racial impact.  I have ignored race in my 
constitutional analysis, because the instruments do not include it.  But the socioeconomic, 
family, and neighborhood variables that they do include are highly correlated with race, as is 
criminal history, so they are likely to have a racially disparate impact.126  Although the courts 
have not recognized equal protection claims grounded in disparate impact, policymakers should 
care about the consequences of their policies, and not just about the facial distinctions that they 
draw.  Ample literature documents mass incarceration’s severe consequences for African-
American communities in particular.  If EBS exacerbates this problem, it would be particularly 
hard to defend it as a progressive strategy for responding to the mass incarceration crisis. 
The demographic concentration problem is one reason to worry about the gender and age 
variables, in addition to socioeconomic status.  In other contexts, discrimination based on young 
age is often treated as not particularly morally troublesome.  Young age is not a significant social 
disadvantage, nor is it even really a discrete group trait; everyone has it and then loses it.  
Likewise, many advocates no doubt worry less about gender discrimination that adversely affects 
men because men, taken as a whole, have dominant political and economic power.  But the likely 
impact of EBS is not centered on “men taken as a whole,” nor on young people generally.  
Rather, it will principally affect a subgroup of young men—those involved in the criminal justice 
system, mostly poor men of color—who are highly disadvantaged.  The age and gender criteria 
exacerbate the extent to which incarceration’s impact targets a particular slice of disadvantaged 
communities, effectively resulting in a substantial part of a generation of men being absent from 
communities and exacerbating the socially distortive effects of mass incarceration.  A broad 
literature explores the effects of high, demographically concentrated incarceration rates on 
everything from marriage rates to overall community cohesion.127 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 THOMAS BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN 
THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001 (2003). 
124 Center for Labor Market Studies, The Consequences of Dropping Out of School (2009), available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/2047/d20000596; see also Robert J. Sampson & Charles Loeffler, Punishment’s Place: The 
Local Concentration of Mass Incarceration, DAEDALUS (Summer 2010) (discussing neighborhood effects). 
125 E.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 
(2011); TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED 
NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007); IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION (Mary 
Patillo et al. eds., 2004). 
126 See Harcourt, supra note 55 (arguing that “prior criminal history has become a proxy for race”).   
127 Todd R. Clear, supra, at 97; William A. Darity, Jr. & Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Family Structure and the 
Marginalization of Black Men: Policy Implications, in THE DECLINE IN MARRIAGE OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 263, 
26
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 90 [2013]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/90
66 STANFORD LAW REVIEW __ (FORTHCOMING 2014) 
	   24	  
Another serious disadvantage is the expressive message sent by state endorsement of 
sentencing based on group traits.  Consider specifically the traits associated with socioeconomic 
disadvantage.  Though many Americans no doubt already suspect that the criminal justice system 
is biased against the poor, EBS ends any doubt on the matter.  It involves the state telling judges 
explicitly that poor people should get longer sentences because they are poor—and, conversely, 
that socioeconomic privilege should translate into leniency.   That is a message that, I suspect, 
many state actors would find embarrassing to defend in public.  Doing so would require pointing 
to a justification that hardly improves matters: that the poor are dangerous.  Generalizing about 
groups based on crime risk is a practice with a pernicious social history.128   Dressing up that 
generalization in scientific language may have succeeded in forestalling public criticism, but 
mostly because few Americans understand these instruments or even are aware of them.  If the 
instruments were better understood (and as EBS expands, perhaps they will be), they would send 
a clear message to disadvantaged groups: the system really is rigged.  Further, if that message 
undermines the criminal justice system’s legitimacy in disadvantaged communities, it could 
undermine EBS’s crime prevention aims.129 
Some EBS advocates propose that it should be used only to mitigate sentences, and such 
proposals have, at first glance, a seductive appeal—reducing incarceration rates is an important 
objective.130  But there is no persuasive reason to believe access to risk predictions would tend to 
reduce sentences rather than increasing them (or doing both in different cases).  Some advocates 
blame a retributivist approach to sentencing for the rise in incarceration, and suggest that EBS 
would help to make sentencing more moderate by encouraging a practical focus on crime 
prevention instead.131  This line of argument is curious, however, because much of the political 
“tough on crime” movement over the past several decades has in fact been accompanied by 
public safety language, responding to the public’s (oft-exaggerated) perceptions of crime risk.132 
One could attempt to force unidirectional use of risk assessments, but it may be difficult.   
If judges are given the risk assessments before they choose the sentence, even if they are told to 
only use them for mitigation, it is difficult to expect them to completely ignore high-risk 
assessments.133  And even if the risk score is not provided until an initial sentence is chosen, 
judges who know that subsequent mitigation will be available if it turns out that the defendant is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 (M. Belinda Tucker & Claudia Mitchell-Kernan eds., 1995); Bruce Western et al., Incarceration and the Bonds 
Between Parents in Fragile Families, in IMPRISONING AMERICA, supra, at 21-45; Elizabeth I. Johnson & Jane 
Waldfogel, Children of Incarcerated Parents, in IMPRISONING AMERICA, supra, at 98; James P. Lynch & William J. 
Sabol, Effects of Incarceration on Informal Social Control in Communities, in IMPRISONING AMERICA, supra, at 
135-164. 
128 For a recent, prominent reflection on the way such generalizations about black men have affected African-
American communities, see Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Trayvon Martin (July 19, 2013), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/19/remarks-president-trayvon-martin. 
129 See William Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1825-30 (1998) (discussing the effects of 
community perceptions of unfairness on law compliance). 
130 E.g., Etienne, supra; J. Richard Couzens, Evidence-Based Practices: Reducing Recidivism to Increase Public 
Safety: A Cooperative Effort by Courts and Probation 10 (June 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/EVIDENCE-BASED-PRACTICES-Summary-6-27-11.pdf; Kleiman, supra, at 
301 (explaining that Virginia’s EBS program diverts 25% of nonviolent prison-bound offenders to probation).  
131 Marcus, supra, at 751. 
132 Rachel Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1278-81 (2005). 
133 Analogously, limiting instructions to juries—instructions to consider evidence for one purpose but not another—
are “notoriously ineffective” and “may be counterproductive because they call jurors’ attention to the evidence that 
is supposed to be ignored.”  Prescott & Starr, supra, at 323 (citing studies). 
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low risk might err on the side of higher preliminary sentences.  Likewise, the risk scores could 
affect the parties’ strategies; in particular, prosecutors might push for longer sentences for 
higher-risk offenders.  Even if the scores are withheld at first from the parties, given that the 
instruments are quite simple, one would expect the parties to calculate the scores themselves and 
plan accordingly, and not to wait for the official report. 
But let us hypothesize that it could be guaranteed that risk scores would only reduce 
sentences.  Would such an approach be justified?  I am loath to resist strategies for reducing 
unnecessary incarceration.  But the key question here is not whether low-risk defendants should 
be diverted from incarceration—it is whether those low-risk diversion candidates should be 
identified based on constitutionally problematic demographic and socioeconomic characteristics 
(instead of past or present criminal conduct or other personal, behavioral assessments).   
I conclude that such an approach raises the same problems as does EBS generally.  As a 
constitutional matter, policies that benefit only the lowest-risk offenders may actually be more 
objectionable because they are less flexible and narrowly tailored—more like quotas than “plus 
factors.”  Those with sufficiently unfavorable demographic and socioeconomic characteristics 
will never qualify as “low risk,” no matter how favorable their other characteristics.  Consider 
the Missouri instrument described in Part I.  A 20-year-old high school dropout with no job loses 
six points for those characteristics alone, and can never score higher than 1 on the scale 
(“average” risk), even if he has no criminal history and no other risk factors and has committed a 
relatively minor offense.  Other instruments that consider gender and a wider variety of 
socioeconomic and family traits could be even more strongly driven by those factors.134 
Special exceptions for the privileged cut against the foundational principle that the justice 
system should treat everyone equally.  Moreover, one likely driver of the growth of incarceration 
is that the relatively privileged majority of the population has been spared its brunt.135  Those 
who are primarily incarcerated—poor young men of color—are not politically well represented, 
and most other citizens have little reason to worry about the growth of incarceration.  
Progressives should hesitate before endorsing policies that give them another reason not to 
worry, even if those policies will have the immediate effect of somewhat restraining that growth.   
Merely raising the potential policy concerns associated with discrimination and disparity 
does not necessarily end the argument, just as the constitutional inquiry is not ended by 
establishing that EBS merits heightened constitutional scrutiny.  One must consider how strongly 
EBS advances competing state interests.  In the next Part, then, I turn to the question whether the 
studies support EBS advocates’ optimism.   
III. Assessing the Evidence for Evidence-Based Sentencing 
Protecting society from crime while avoiding excessive incarceration is no doubt an 
important interest, even a “compelling” one.  But the Constitution and good policy also require 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 The mitigation-only approach also would not deprive defendants of standing to challenge EBS; a defendant who 
would have received diversion to probation had the risk instrument not considered his gender, for instance, is 
harmed by that consideration.  The Supreme Court has often considered equal protection challenges in which the 
plaintiff claims she was denied a government benefit (such as university admission) on the basis of some improper 
consideration. E.g., Fisher, __ S.Ct. at __. 
135 James Forman, Jr., Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993, 1001 (2010); William J. 
Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1974 (2008). 
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assessing the strength of the relationship between EBS and that interest.  When heightened 
scrutiny applies, it is the state’s burden to provide convincing evidence establishing that 
relationship.  In this Part, I show that the current empirical evidence does not suffice. 
A. Precision, Group Averages, and Individual Predictions 
The instruments’ first serious limitation is that they do not provide anything even 
approaching a precise prediction of an individual’s recidivism probability.  At best, what they 
predict with reasonable precision is the average recidivism rate for all offenders who share with 
the defendant whichever characteristics are included as variables in the model. If the model is 
well specified and based on a sample that is representative of the population to which the results 
are extrapolated, then it might perform this task well.  But that does not necessarily make it 
particularly useful for individual predictions.  Individual vary much more than groups do, and 
even a relatively precisely estimated model will often not do well at predicting individual 
outcomes in particular cases.136  Social scientists sometimes refer to the broader ranges attached 
to individual predictions as “prediction intervals” (or sometimes as “forecast” uncertainty or 
“confidence intervals for a forecast”) to distinguish them from the “confidence intervals” that are 
estimated for the group mean or for the effect of a given variable.   
To illustrate this point, let’s start with an example that involves predicting a continuous 
outcome rather than a binary future event.  To simplify, we will consider only one explanatory 
variable (sex) and one normally distributed outcome variable (height), which are quite strongly 
related.  The height distributions of the U.S. male and female populations look approximately 
like Figure 1 below, which is based on average heights of 70 inches for males (standard 
deviation 3 inches) and 65 inches for females (standard deviation 2.5 inches).  
 
But suppose one did not know the true population distributions, and one had to estimate 
them by taking a random sample.  If one takes a large enough sample, it is easy to obtain quite 
precise estimates of the average male height and the average female height (as well as the 
average additional height associated with being male, which is just the difference between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 See David J. Cooke & Christine Michie, Limits of Diagnostic Precision and Predictive Utility in the Individual 
Case, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 259, 259 (2010) (“It is a statistical truism that the mean of a distribution tells us 
about everyone, yet no one.”). 
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group means).  This point is illustrated in Table 1.  I created simulated data for a “true 
population” of men and women that has the height distributions shown in Figure 1.  Then I drew 
from that population random samples with sample sizes 20, 200, and 400, regressed height on 
gender within each sample, and recorded the predicted mean heights for men and women and the 
confidence intervals for those means.  
 
Table	  1.	  	  Precision	  of	  Predicted	  Means	  versus	  Individual	  Forecasts:	  An	  Illustration	   	  
Sample	  
Size	  
Male	  Height	  in	  Inches	   Female	  Height	  in	  Inches	  
Mean	  (&	  
Forecast)	  
95%	  Conf.	  Int.	  
for	  the	  Mean	  
95%	  Pred.	  Int.	  for	  
Indiv.	  Forecast	  
Mean	  (&	  
Forecast)	  
95%	  Conf.	  Int.	  
for	  the	  Mean	  
95%	  Pred.	  Int.	  for	  
Indiv.	  Forecast	  
20	   69.8	   [68.2,	  71.4]	   [64.4,	  75.1]	   64.8	   [63.2,	  66.4]	   [59.4,	  70.1]	  
200	   69.8	   [69.3,	  70.4]	   [64.3,	  75.4]	   64.6	   [64.0,	  65.1]	   [59.0,	  70.1]	  
400	   70.0	   [69.6,	  70.4]	   [64.6,	  75.4]	   64.9	   [64.5,	  65.3]	   [59.5,	  70.3]	  
Samples	  are	  drawn	  from	  a	  simulated	  "true	  population"	  with	  population	  means	  and	  standard	  deviations	  of	  70.0	  
(3.0)	  for	  men	  and	  65.0	  (2.5)	  for	  women.	  	  	  
 
Notice that even the smallest sample quite closely approximates the true population 
means of 70 and 65 inches, while the largest sample comes even closer.  Exactly how close each 
sample comes involves chance (different random samples of the same sizes would have different 
means), but in general chance plays a smaller role the larger the sample is; as the sample grows 
the estimates should converge on the true population values.  This expectation is captured in the 
estimation of confidence intervals for the mean, which get narrower as the sample gets larger. 
Confidence intervals are a way of accounting for chance in sampling.  For the 400-person 
sample, one can express 95% condidence in quite a precise estimate: for males, between 69.6 
inches and 70.4 inches, and for females, between 64.5 inches and 65.3 inches.137  If you keep 
drawing more and more 400-person samples, they don’t tend to differ very much; with that 
sample size, you will generally do quite a good job approximating the underlying population, 
which is why the confidence interval is narrow. Meanwhile, the 20-person sample gives you 
wider 95% confidence intervals, each spanning more than three inches—a much rougher 
estimate. 
But what if you wanted to use your 400-person sample not to estimate the averages for 
the population, but to predict the height of just the next random woman you meet?  Your single 
best guess—the one that is statistically expected to err by the lowest margin—would be the 
group mean from your sample, which is 64.9.  But you wouldn’t be nearly as confident in that 
prediction as you would in the prediction for the group mean.  In fact, within that sample, only 
13.5% of women have heights that are between 64.5 inches and 65.3 inches, which was your 
95% confidence interval for the group mean.  If you wanted to give an individual forecast for 
that next woman that you could be 95% confident in, it would have to be much less precise—you 
could predict that she would be somewhere between 59.5 inches and 70.3 inches, the 95% 
prediction interval for the individual forecast that is shown in Table 1. That’s a range of nearly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 To describe something as a 95% confidence interval for an estimated group mean is to express confidence that 
95% of the time, when one draws a random sample and uses the same estimation procedure, the interval one 
estimates will contain the true group mean for the underlying population.   
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eleven inches—in other words, you don’t know much at all about how tall to expect the next 
woman to be.138   
 One could make the example much more complicated, with multiple variables and more 
irregular distributions of outcomes, but the prediction interval for an individual forecast is always 
wider than the confidence interval for the mean—generally much wider.139  Note that while the 
confidence intervals for the means gets much narrower as the sample gets larger, the prediction 
interval does not.  The underlying uncertainty that it reflects is not mainly the possibility of 
having gotten an unusual sample; it’s the variability in the underlying population that we saw in 
Figure 1. One could narrow the prediction interval by adding variables to the regression that help 
to explain this underlying variability—for example, the heights of the individual’s parents. 
The same basic intuition also applies to models of binary outcomes, like whether a 
defendant will recidivate—the expected outcome for an individual is much less certain than the 
expected rate for a group.  Some of the recidivism risk prediction instruments include confidence 
intervals for the probabilities they predict.  Indeed, some scholars have urged that confidence 
intervals should always be provided (rather than mere point estimates) so that judges can get an 
idea of how precise the instruments are.140    But given that judges are using the instruments for 
the purpose of predicting a specific individual’s probability of recidivism, providing them a 
confidence interval for the group recidivism rate might even be more misleading than not 
providing any at all.  For instance, if judges are told “The estimated probability that Defendant X 
will recidivate is 30%, and the 95% confidence interval for that prediction is 25% to 35%,” that 
may well sound to the judge like a reasonably precise individual prediction, but it is not.  It is 
merely a reasonably precise estimate of an average recidivism rate.141  If the underlying study 
has a large sample size, such a prediction could be very precise even if the model’s variables do 
not capture much of the variation in individual probabilities at all.   
With binary outcomes, though, while the confidence interval for the mean may be 
misleading, the “prediction interval” is not a very useful alternative way of expressing the 
precision of an individual forecast, because it does not tell you anything that was not already 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Note that the estimated uncertainties in Table 1 are based on a regression of height on gender using standard Stata 
postestimation prediction commands.  By construction, the uncertainties are the same for men and women.  Another 
way to estimate a 95% prediction interval for the height of the next woman you meet would be to just ignore the 
men and give the range within which the middle 95% of the women in your sample fall.  Because female height has 
a slightly narrower distribution, your interval would then be a bit narrower (about 10 inches), but this method would 
produce a wider interval for the next male’s height (about 12 inches).  These ranges are marked on Figure 1. 
139 See Cooke & Michie, supra, at 271 (illustrating this point using simulated data on violence risk among 
psychiatric patients, and showing how measurement error for subjective criteria amplifies the uncertainty of 
individual predictions). 
140 E.g., McGarraugh, supra, at 1095-96. 
141 This problem has some similarities to the broader problem of assessing scientific evidence of causation in legal 
contexts, in which “the law is interested not simply in whether a particular variable causes a particular effect [in 
general], but, ultimately, in whether a particular variable did cause the effect [in the specific case].”  David L. 
Faigman, A Preliminary Exploration of the Problem of Reasoning from General Scientific Data to Individualized 
Legal Decision-Making, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1115, 1119 (2010).   But this issue is not identical, and my objection 
here is not that the models cannot establish “individual-level causation,” McGarraugh, supra, at 1101.  The models 
are predictive, and make no causal claims, so their advocates cannot be accused of confusing correlation with 
causation. And they aim to predict future probabilistic events, not to prove what caused a particular past event.  
When one’s goal is merely to predict, correlations can be useful, even if the causal pathway is uncertain.  For 
instance, how one voted in the 2012 presidential election is no doubt a very strong predictor of how one will vote in 
2016—information campaign strategists can use even if the former does not cause the latter.   
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made clear by the point estimate itself.  Unless the predicted probability is extremely low or 
extremely high, a 95% confidence interval for an individual prediction will by nature always run 
from 0 to 1.142  Recidivism is rarely nearly certain or nearly impossible. So even a good 
recidivism prediction model could produce prediction intervals of [0,1] for essentially every 
defendant: that is, the only prediction that can be made with 95% confidence about any given 
individual is that she will either recidivate or not.  This fact does not reflect poorly on the design 
of the prediction instruments or the quality of the underlying research.  It reflects the inherent 
uncertainty of this predictive task and the binary nature of the outcome. 
In order to assess how well a model predicts recidivism risk for individuals, some other 
metric is necessary.143 There is no single, agreed-upon method for assessing the individual 
predictive accuracy of a binary model, but there are several possibilities. One common metric 
used in the recidivism prediction literature is called the “area under the curve” (AUC) 
approach.144  This method pairs each person who ended up recidivating with a random person 
who did not; the score is the fraction of these pairs in which the recidivist had been given the 
higher predicted risk score.  A perfect, omniscient model would rank all eventual recidivists 
higher than all eventual non-recidivists, and the AUC score would be a 1, while coin flips would 
on average produce a score of 0.5.   The best published scores for recidivism prediction 
instruments appear to be around 0.75, and these are rich models that include various dynamic 
risk factors, including detailed psychological assessments, rather than the simple point systems 
based on objective factors.145  Many studies have reported AUC scores closer to 0.65.146 By 
comparison, a prominent meta-analysis of studies of psychologists’ clinical (non-actuarial) 
predictions of violence found a mean AUC score of 0.73, which the author characterized as a 
“modest, better than chance level of accuracy.”147  As another point of comparison, if one turns 
height into a binary variable called “tall” (which denotes being above the median height of the 
sample), our basic, one-variable model does much better at predicting who will be tall than any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 See R. Karl Hanson & Philip D. Howard, Individual Confidence Intervals Do Not Inform Decision-Makers about 
the Accuracy of Risk Assessment Evaluations, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 275, 276 (2010) 
143 See Hanson & Howard, supra, at 276.  Stephen D. Hart et al., Precision of Actuarial Risk Assessment 
Instruments, 174 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY s60 (2007), offer an alternative way of calculating a prediction interval for an 
individual.  They use a traditional method for estimating the confidence interval for a probability prediction given a 
point estimate for the probability and a sample size, and calculate it for each risk-level category in two common 
violence prediction instruments, using a sample size of 1.  See E.B. Wilson, Probable Inference, The Law of 
Succession, and Statistical Inference, 22 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 209 (1927).  The intervals Hart et al. calculate do not 
always run from 0 to 1, but they are always very wide, ranging between 79 and 89 percentage points in width.  The 
authors conclude that it is “impossible to make accurate predictions about individuals using these tests.”   
Hart et al. interpret their intervals as follows: “Given an individual with an ARAI score in this particular 
category, we can state with 95% certainty that the probability he will recidivate lies between the upper and lower 
limit.'”  This is a slightly odd interpretation, given that, as the authors state, Wilson’s confidence intervals are 
normally interpreted as expressing an interval within which one is confident that the actual observed rate for the 
new sample (not the ex ante probability) will fall.  The actual observed binary outcome for one individual always 
must be 0 or 1, however, so I agree with Hanson and Howard, supra, that the prediction interval for all but the 
extreme cases should be 0, 1 (rather than, say, .10 to .94).  But either way, it is wide. 
144 See Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate About Accuracy, 62 J. CONSULTING & 
CLINICAL PSYCH. 783 (1994) (describing the method as well as competing approaches). 
145See Mairead Dolan & Michael Doyle, Violence Risk Prediction, 177 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 303, 305-07 (2000); 
AOUSC, supra, at 9. 
146 Dolan & Doyle, supra, at 305-07. 
147 Mossman, supra, at 788. 
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actuarial model does at predicting who will recidivate—it has an AUC score of 0.825.148  This is 
despite the fact that, as we saw, that model gives only rather wide bounds for individual 
predictions of height—gender is actually quite a strong predictor of height (most men are taller 
than most women), but it still leaves considerable individual variation unexplained.149 
Another simple measure of prediction accuracy is the linear correlation between the 
predicted probabilities and the actual outcomes for offenders; this measure will be 0 if the 
instrument explains nothing more than chance and 1 if it predicts perfectly.150  In 1994, a 
prominent meta-analysis of studies comparing several actuarial recidivism prediction instruments 
found that the LSI-R (the instrument that the Indiana Supreme Court upheld) had the highest 
reported correlation with outcomes, at 0.35.151  By comparison, the gender-only model of the 
binary “tall” variable has a correlation coefficient of 0.65 (in the same sample used above).   
All in all, these metrics suggest that the prediction models do have individual predictive 
value, but they do not make a resounding case for them.  Again, this should not be seen as an 
indictment of the quality of the science—it is just that even given all the best insights of decades 
of criminological and psychological research, recidivism remains an extremely difficult outcome 
to predict at an individual level, much more difficult than height.  The models improve 
considerably on chance, which for some policy purposes (or for the purpose of mental health 
treatment decisions, which is what many of the models were originally developed for) is no 
doubt quite valuable.  But to justify group-based discrimination in sentencing, both the 
Constitution and good policy require a much more demanding standard for predictive accuracy.  
Moreover, note that the accuracy measures discussed here assess the total predictive power of 
each recidivism model, combining all its variables, and are thus overly generous for the purpose 
of assessing whether particular variables should be included in the model. The marginal 
predictive power added by just the constitutionally problematic variables is even less, as 
discussed in the next Section. 
The basic difference between individual and group predictions has been pointed out by 
some scholars in the empirical literature surrounding the risk prediction instruments.152  But it is 
lost in much of the EBS legal and policy literature, and more importantly, it may be lost on 
judges and prosecutors, who may have an inflated understanding of the estimates’ precision. 
Hannah-Moffat explored this issue by interviewing lawyers and probation officers in Canada, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 This is estimated in the same 400-person sample used above, pairing each “tall” person with one “short” person, 
scoring the prediction as correct (i.e., 1) if the tall person was male (i.e., predicted to be taller) and the short person 
was female, incorrect in the reverse case (0), and as 0.5 if the two had the same gender (i.e., predicted to have the 
same height), following the standard tie-breaking procedure used to calculate AUC scores.  Conversely, if one pairs 
200 random women with one random man each (eliminating the possibility of “tied” gender), the man is taller 89% 
of the time—much better than the chance level of 50%.  
149 Note that a 95% prediction interval for an individual forecast of the binary variable “tall” would run from 0 to 1 
for both men and women—one could not be anywhere close to 95% confident that any given woman would be 
short, or that any given man would be tall.  In the sample, 17.5% of women and 82.5% of men were “tall.” 
150 The square of this correlation coefficient is one variant on the “fit” measure “pseudo R-squared.”  This and 
several other variants could be used to assess a model’s ability to explain individual variation, although none should 
be interpreted as a measure of the overall quality of the model.  For a concise summary, see Institute for Digital 
Research & Education, FAQ: What are pseudo R-squareds?, 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/Psuedo_RSquareds.htm. 
151 Paul Gendreau et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Recidivism: What Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 
575, tbl. 4 (1994). 
152 See, e.g., Hart et al., supra; Cooke & Michie, supra. 
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where risk instruments are common.  She found that even if caveats about the difference between 
group and individual predictions are provided, the message often does not get through:  
[F]ew understand and appropriately interpret probability scores. Despite receiving 
training on these tools and their interpretation, practitioners tended to struggle with the 
meaning of the risk score….Rather than understanding that an individual who obtains a 
high risk score shares characteristics of an aggregate group of high-risk offenders, the 
individual is likely to become known as a high-risk offender.  Instead of being understood 
as correlations, risk scores are misconstrued in court submissions, pre-sentence reports, 
and the range of institutional file narratives that ascribe the characteristics of a risk 
category to the individual.153 
Advocates of actuarial methods, in this and other contexts, have often sharply criticized 
the claim that it is not safe to draw conclusions about individuals based on group averages.  Mark 
Cunningham and Thomas Reedy argue that the “distinction between individualized as opposed to 
group methods is a false dichotomy,” contending, essentially, that truly individualized methods 
do not exist; the discipline of psychology, and its sub-discipline of violence prediction, draws its 
fundamental scientific character from its willingness to draw insights from data collected on 
groups and apply them to individuals.154   Likewise, EBS advocate Richard Redding quotes Paul 
Meehl, an early pioneer in actuarial prediction in psychology: “If a clinician says ‘This case is 
different’ or ‘It’s not like the ones in your [actuarial] table,’…the obvious question is ‘Why 
should we care whether you think this one is different or whether you are surer?”155 Jennifer 
Skeem and John Monahan, quoting Grove and Meehl, argue: 
Our view is that group data can be, and in many cases empirically are, highly informative 
when making decisions about individual cases….[C]onsider the revolver analogy of 
Grove and Meehl: 
…Two revolvers are placed on the table, and you are informed that one of them has 
five live rounds with one empty chamber, the other has five empty chambers and one 
live cartridge, and you are required to play Russian roulette….Would you seriously 
think ‘Well, it doesn’t make any difference what the odds are.  Inasmuch as I’m only 
going to do this once, there is no aggregate involved, so I might as well pick either 
one of these two revolvers; it doesn’t matter which?”156  
These responses strike me as off base. I do not argue, nor could anybody, that group 
averages have nothing to do with individual behavior.  Of course group averages will on average 
predict outcomes for the individuals in the group—that much is a tautology—and thus provide 
some information that could guide individual decision-making.  But that does not always mean 
that the group average tells us much about what to expect for any given individual.  One does not 
have to be naïve to think that an individual case may be different from the average if it’s a 
situation in which individual outcomes in fact vary widely.  The question is how much individual 
variation there is in a given population, and how much of that variation the variables in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Hannah-Moffat, supra, at 12-13. 
154 Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, Violence Risk Assessment at Federal Capital Sentencing, 29 CRIM. 
JUST. & BEHAV. 512, 517 (2002); accord Jessica M. Tanner, “Continuing Threat” to Whom?: Risk Assessment in 
Virginia Capital Sentencing Hearings, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 381, 402-05 (2005).   
155 Redding, supra, at 12 n.52 (quoting Paul E. Meehl, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1954)). 
156 Jennifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment, U. Va. School of Law 
Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2011-13, 9-10. 
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model explain.  In the recidivism context (unlike, for instance, the Russian roulette context), the 
variables included in the instruments leave most of the variation unexplained.157 
 One could defend the instruments on the ground that the precision of individual 
predictions does not matter from an efficiency perspective.  If the group average estimates are 
good, then the model will, averaged across cases, improve judges’ predictions of recidivism, 
leading more efficient use overall of the state’s incarceration resources to prevent crime.   
There are two main problems with this response.  First, it almost certainly does not 
suffice for constitutional purposes, at least with respect to any variable triggering heightened 
scrutiny.  The argument amounts to the claim that it doesn’t matter whether an instrument has 
any meaningful predictive power for individuals, so long as the group generalizations have some 
truth to them.  But this is exactly the kind of statistical discrimination defense that the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly rejected.   This point is one reason the Russian roulette analogy is inapt.  I 
would, of course, choose the gun with just one bullet.  And if the same dictator forced me to 
choose between driving on a highway on which 2% of the drivers were drunk and one in which 
0.18% of the drivers were drunk, I would choose 0.18% every time.  But just that disparity did 
not suffice, in Craig v. Boren, to justify a gender-discriminatory alcohol law.  When 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics are used to justify the state’s serious adverse 
treatment of individuals, the Constitution requires more than a statistical generalization.  Nobody 
would worry that choosing the gun with one bullet is unfair or harmful to the gun with five.  But 
it is not harmless to base an individual’s incarceration on a statistical inference that, based on his 
poverty or gender, treats him as the human equivalent of a loaded gun.  
Second, the “efficient discrimination” argument is not even necessarily correct in terms 
of efficiency.  It is not true that any model with any improved predictive power over chance will 
provide efficiency gains, because EBS isn’t replacing chance. If the actuarial instruments don’t 
capture much of the individual variation in recidivism probability, then there is certainly a 
possibility that the thing EBS is meant to displace—judges’ “clinical” prediction of risk—might 
actually be more efficient because it captures more of that variation.  This point is explored 
further in the next Section.  
B.  Do the Instruments Outperform Clinical Prediction and Other Alternatives? 
 The Bearden test requires assessment of whether other available and nondiscriminatory 
(or less discriminatory) alternatives could accomplish the state’s penological objectives.  Here, I 
consider two such alternatives: actuarial methods that do not rely on constitutionally troubling 
variables; and judges’ exercise of their professional judgment (“clinical” prediction).  Even if 
analysis of alternatives were not constitutionally required, if EBS does not improve at least on 
the clinical method that it seeks to replace, it does not substantially advance the state’s 
penological interests, and is also undesirable on policy grounds.  
EBS advocates have concluded that it is superior to available alternatives, but they have 
had to stretch the existing evidence quite far to support this claim. J.C. Oleson, for instance, 
argues that even inclusion of race would be constitutionally permissible, and concludes that it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 In the Russian roulette hypothetical, the decision-maker is given the only variable that matters.  The number of 
bullets quite strongly predicts the individual’s probability of dying; it would explain most of the individual variation, 
with the remaining variation being pure chance.  The recidivism models are not in the same ballpark. 
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“straightforward” to show that no less restrictive means is available.158  To support this 
conclusion, he cites just a single study from 1987, by Joan Petersilia and Susan Turner, for the 
proposition that “omitting race-correlated factors from a model to predict recidivism reduced the 
accuracy of the model by five to twelve percentage points.”  Even taking this at face value, it 
hardly seems obvious that a statistical advantage this modest would justify explicit sentencing 
discrimination based on race; the Supreme Court has rejected gender discrimination based on 
stronger statistical evidence than that.  And given the Supreme Court’s disparate impact 
jurisprudence, it is odd to justify including race itself based on the predictive power of race-
correlated factors from the model. 
More importantly for present purposes, the Petersilia and Turner study actually suggests 
that demographic and socioeconomic factors could be excluded from risk prediction instruments 
without losing any significant predictive value. The “race-correlated factors” in their study 
included criminal history and crime characteristics, which accounted for all the additional 
explanatory value provide by correlates of race (and which no sentencing scheme ignores).159  
Once those factors were already included, adding “demographic” and “other” variables—which 
included employment, education, marital status, substance abuse, and mental health variables—
did not significantly improve the model’s predictive power.  This is presumably because conduct 
is generally a better predictor of future conduct than static characteristics are, a point other 
studies corroborate.  For instance, Douglas Mossman’s 1994 meta-analysis of studies concerning 
violence prediction found that “the average accuracy of predictions based on past behavior is 
higher” than either mental health professionals’ clinical judgments or actuarial instruments.160 
More recent studies of risk prediction instruments have typically not broken down the 
extent to which adding socioeconomic and demographic variables improves the overall 
predictive power of the model (a distinct question from the coefficients on those variables).   But 
Peterilia’s and Turner’s results, at least, suggest that a viable alternative is to base actuarial 
prediction only on crime characteristics and criminal history.   Of course, existing sentencing 
schemes already incorporate those variables, so perhaps providing judges with risk predictions 
based on them would be redundant.   It would be more sensible to have the sentencing 
commission or legislature incorporate the instruments’ insights when determining sentencing 
ranges.  But the fact that an instrument like this might not be terribly useful to judges does not 
mean that the instruments with the additional variables are more useful; the Petersilia and Turner 
study, at least, suggests that they are not. 
Even setting aside the possibility of using different actuarial instruments, what about the 
basic question whether the instruments outperform clinical prediction?  It is gospel in the EBS 
literature that they do.  But while scores of studies have found that actuarial prediction methods 
outperform clinical judgment, this finding is not universal, the average accuracy edge is not 
drastic, and the vast majority of studies are from wholly different contexts (such as medical 
diagnosis or business failure prediction).  In one widely cited meta-analysis, Grove et al. 
evaluated all the studies addressing the actuarial versus clinical comparison that were published 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Oleson, supra, at 1386; see id. at 1387 (also concluding that “[o]nce the constitutional door is open to race, all 
other sentencing factors can pass through: gender, age, marital status, education, class, and so forth.”). 
159 Petersilia & Turner, supra, at 171 (showing, in the table for “All Convicted Defendants,” that 57% of outcomes 
could be accurately predicted by chance, 60% when racially noncorrelated factors were added, 67% when crime 
characteristics were added, 70% when criminal history variables were added, and still 70% when demographic and 
“other” variables were added). 
160 Mossman, supra, at 789-90. 
36
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 90 [2013]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/90
66 STANFORD LAW REVIEW __ (FORTHCOMING 2014) 
	   34	  
between 1945 and 1994 and that met certain quality criteria; just five criminal recidivism studies 
made the cut, plus 131 other studies.161  Overall, actuarial prediction performed on average about 
10% better, but the authors warned: “However, our results qualify overbroad statements in the 
literature opining that such superiority is completely uniform; it is not. In half of the studies we 
analyzed, the clinical method is approximately as good as mechanical prediction, and in a few 
scattered instances, the clinical method was notably more accurate.”162 
If the actuarial advantage does not exist in half of studied contexts, then it is obvious that 
the specifics matter. And the EBS literature often cites research on far more complicated 
instruments than the simple ones (like Missouri’s, described above) that states actually use. Take, 
for instance, a study by Grant Harris, Marie Rice, and Catherine Cormier testing an instrument 
called the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide, which has been cited by EBS advocates.163  The 
VRAG consists of twelve variables, the first and most heavily weighted of which is itself a 
composite of twenty variables: “conning, lying, manipulation, callousness, lack of remorse, 
proneness to boredom, shallow affect, irresponsibility, impulsivity, poor behavior controls, 
criminal versatility, juvenile delinquency, sexual promiscuity, and parasitic lifestyle.”164  
Assessing these factors requires an elaborate psychological profile, which in the study was 
carried out by groups of mental health clinicians who “knew the patients well.” 165  Nothing like 
this is typically involved in EBS.  Even in the case of sentencing instruments that try to use 
somewhat nuanced personality characteristics, like the LSI-R, it is not at all obvious that a 
probation officer filling out a presentence report can carry out a comparable analysis.  The 
VRAG’s success simply says nothing about the potential success of a totally different instrument 
and assessment process.  Moreover, the comparability of the populations is also dubious; the 
VRAG studies involved Canadian psychiatric patients.166   
Indeed, the past success of instruments that rely on elaborate personality profiles may, if 
anything, suggest a disadvantage of the EBS instruments. The studies show that ideally, after a 
trained clinician collects all the relevant information and makes the numerous required 
qualitative assessments, her ultimate predictions will be better informed if she then uses an 
actuarial model to tell her how much weight to give each factor.  This result is unsurprising.  But 
it is a far cry from saying that a different actuarial model that relies on far less overall 
information (completely ignoring all of the qualitative personality factors) will outperform the 
judgment of a judge who has had a chance to assess the individual defendant and the complete 
facts of the case. The relevant comparison, in short, is not just between actuarial versus clinical 
weighting of variables.  It is between actuarial weighting of a few variables versus clinical 
weighting of a much wider range of variables.167   It is possible that the actuarial instruments 
would win that comparison, but we cannot conclude that based on existing research.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 W.M. Grove et al, Clinical vs. Mechanical Prediction: A Meta-analysis, 12 PSYCH. ASSESSMENT 19, 22-24 
(2000) (listing studies. 
162 Id. at 22-24. 
163 Grant T. Harris et al., Prospective Replication of the “Violence Risk Appraisal Guide” in Predicting Violent 
Recidivism Among Forensic Patients, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 377 (2002); see Wolff, supra, at n.73. 
164 Harris et al., supra, at 378. 
165 Id. at 379.   
166 Id. at 381.    
167 Psychologist Stephen Hart states that similar simplified instruments for predicting sexual violence arguably do 
not deserve even the label “evidence-based” because “scientific and professional literature would not consider [it] 
informed, guided, or structured since they only include a relatively small set of risk factors.”  Stephen D. Hart, 
Evidence-Based Assessment of Risk for Sexual Violence, 1 CHAPMAN J. CRIM. JUST. 143, 155, 164 (2009).   
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A review of each of the five older recidivism studies that Grove et al. included in their 
meta-analysis likewise does not produce any meaningful support for the modern EBS 
instruments. Two of the five studies found no discernable advantage for actuarial prediction.168   
Glaeser (1955), one of two studies that found a substantial advantage, involves an archaic 
prediction instrument in which the most strongly predictive variable was the offender’s 
(clinically assessed) “social development pattern”: “Respected Citizen,” “Inadequate,” “Fairly 
Conventional,” “Ne’er-Do-Well,” “Floater,” “Dissipated,” and “Socially Maladjusted.”169 It also 
involved very few clinical decisionmakers (four psychiatrists and four sociologists who worked 
in a parole system in the 1940s), so one possible explanation for the results is that a couple of 
these people might have not have been terribly good at their jobs.170 A study by Wormith and 
Goldstone (1984) evaluates an instrument with more objective criteria and also found that it 
predicted recidivism better than did the parole board’s actual (clinical) decisions.  But the study 
relied on a small Canadian sample that the authors warned “should not be construed as being 
representative of incarcerated offenders either nationally or internationally.”171  The authors also 
warned that their measures of clinical and actuarial judgment were not really fairly comparable, 
in that the “clinical prediction” was not actually a risk prediction at all (instead, it was a binary 
parole decision), whereas the actuarial prediction was.172  Finally, a study by Sacks (1974) 
includes a brief analysis of the clinical versus actuarial comparison, but the comparison it draws 
is nonsensical (the clinical measure is a parole decision, but only those granted parole are 
included in the sample) and the purported actuarial advantage is in any case small and not tested 
for significance.173 
Nor are more recently published studies more compelling.  Oleson et al. (2011) purport to 
compare the accuracy of clinical and actuarial judgment in federal probation officers’ assessment 
of a probationer’s recidivism risk.174  The study included over a thousand decision-makers (but 
only one individual’s case) and used a modern instrument recently developed by the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, called the Federal Post-Conviction Risk Assessment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Terrill L. Holland et al., Comparison and Combination of Statistical and Clinical Predictions of Recidivism 
Among Adult Offenders, 68 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 203 (1983) (finding that individual decisionmakers better predict 
violent recidivism, but actuarial prediction better predicts some measures of overall recidivism); James Smith & 
Richard I. Lanyon, Prediction of Juvenile Probation Violators, 32 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 54 (1968) 
(finding that a juvenile recidivism base expectancy table was slightly more accurate than the predictions of two 
clinical assessors, but was less accurate than simply predicting that everyone would recidivate would have been). 
169 Daniel Glaser, The Efficacy of Alternative Approaches to Parole Prediction, 20 AM. SOC. REV. 283, 285(1955). 
170 Id. Problems like this recur in other actuarial versus clinical studies as well—they state a sample size consisting 
of the number of subjects, and calculate statistical significance as though all of the observations were independent.  
This approach is misleading because there are usually a far smaller number of clinical decision-makers involved in 
the study (standard errors should instead be calculated with clustering on the decision-maker). 
171 J. Stephen Wormith & Colin S. Goldstone, The Clinical and Statistical Prediction of Recidivism, 11 CRIM. JUST. 
& BEHAV. 3 (1984). 
172 Id. at 20.  A general issue with studies that compare real-world “clinical” parole decisions to recidivism risk 
prediction instruments is that the predictive value of a prediction is being compared to that of a decision.  Wormith 
et al. explain that it is unsurprising that the parole decision does not predict recidivism as well as an actuarial 
prediction does, because the parole decision might be affected by factors unrelated to risk prediction, and by the 
desire to err on the side of caution.  Id. 
173 Howard R. Sacks, Promises, Performances, and Principles: An Empirical Study of Parole Decisionmaking in 
Connecticut, 9 CONN. L. REV. 347, 402-403 (1977). 
174 J.C. Oleson et al., Training to See Risk: Measuring the Accuracy of Clinical and Actuarial Risk Assessments 
Among Federal Probation Officers, 75-SEP FED. PROBATION 52 (2011). 
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(PCRA).175 The researchers asked officers to watch a video about an individual and predict his 
risk, and then to redo the exercise after being given the individual’s PCRA score and training in 
the PCRA method.  The researchers concluded that the officers were “more accurate” when they 
had the PCRA.176  But their only evidence for that claim is that officers’ risk scores after being 
given the PCRA and instructed on its implementation were more consistent with the PCRA.  That 
is, in a study purporting to assess whether the PCRA improved prediction accuracy, the 
researchers assumed the PCRA was perfectly accurate; there was no other measure of what the 
“accurate” score was.177  
  In sum, the shibboleth that “actuarial prediction outperforms clinical prediction” is—like 
the actuarial risk predictions themselves—a generalization that is not true in every case.  Its 
accuracy depends on the outcome being evaluated, the actuarial prediction instrument, the 
clinical predictors’ skills, the information on which each is based, and the sample.  There is little 
evidence that the recidivism risk prediction instruments offer any discernable advantage over the 
status quo, and even if they did, that does not mean particular contested variables need to be 
included in the model.  Alternative models might work as well or better. 
C.  Do the Risk Prediction Instruments Address the Right Question? 
Even if the instruments could identify high-risk offenders, does that mean that using them 
would substantially advance the state’s interests?  EBS’s advocates have typically taken this for 
granted, but the answer may well be no.  The instruments tell us, at best, who is at the highest 
risk of recidivism.  They do not tell us whose risk of recidivism will be the most reduced by 
incarceration.  The two questions are not the same, and only the latter directly pertains to the 
state’s penological interests. 
At the outset, let’s precisely identify the state interest that EBS is designed to serve.  Its 
advocates generally refer either to crime prevention, reduction of incarceration, or both.  These 
can be seen as two sides of the same coin: EBS is meant to help the state balance these interests, 
which are at least potentially in tension. I agree that this objective is compelling.  Crime inflicts 
great harm on society, and so does excessive incarceration. Striking an appropriate balance 
between these concerns is an enormous and vital challenge.178 
 But that does not necessarily mean actuarial prediction of recidivism—even if it were 
perfect—substantially advances that interest.  Suppose a judge is considering whether to 
sentence a defendant to five years in prison versus three.   Assuming that the costs of 
incarceration are the same across defendants,179 the question is whether the additional two years’ 
incarceration will reduce enough crime to justify those costs.  The EBS prediction instruments do 
not seek to answer that question.  Their predictions are not conditional on the sentence.  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 This instrument includes qualitative and dynamic factors plus objective factors like age and education.  It is in 
use for planning probation supervision and treatment interventions, not sentencing.  Admin. Office of the U.S. 
Courts, Office of Probation and Pretrial Services, An Overview of the Federal Post Conviction Assessment 1 (Sept. 
2011). 
176 Oleson et al, supra, at 54-55. 
177 The AOUSC’s other validation studies for the PCRA did not compare its effectiveness to clinical prediction, and 
did not find anything close to perfect accuracy.  AOUSC, supra, at 9. 
178 One could frame the state interest as being about the efficient use of finite incarceration resources to maximize 
crime prevention effects.  Unless states have reached their prison capacities and cannot expand, though, I assume 
that the incarceration rate isn’t fixed, so sentencing judges don’t think about incarcerating one defendant as trading 
off with incarceration of another.  Instead, they think about whether that particular sentence is worth its costs. 
179 This assumption may not be true.  Some defendants have families that are affected, for instance. 
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samples in the underlying studies include people given all kinds of sentences.  They measure 
recidivism within a particular period, measured from the time of release or (for probationers) 
from sentencing, but there are no variables relating to the sentence in the regressions.  The judge 
accordingly cannot use the instrument to answer the question “How much crime should I expect 
this defendant to commit if I incarcerate her for five years?”, or three years, or any other 
potential length.  The judge only knows how “risky” she is in the abstract.180 
 This point has been ignored by the EBS literature.  Bernard Harcourt, however, makes a 
similar point about the general deterrence consequences of police profiling and criminal history-
based sentencing enhancements.181  Some have argued that it is efficient for police to focus on 
groups that commit crimes at greater rates because it concentrates the deterrent effect of policing 
on the more dangerous groups.  Harcourt responds that the fact that members of a particular 
group commit more crimes on average does not mean that that group is more readily deterred by 
policing.  In fact, high-risk, socially disadvantaged groups may be less willing to cooperate with 
police, or less deterred by the marginal increase in detection risk, meaning that policing in their 
communities may actually deter fewer crimes than policing in other communities.  The relevant 
question, Harcourt argues, is not rate of crime commission; it is “elasticity” to policing.182 
 Harcourt’s argument focuses on general deterrence effects on community crime rates, but 
a similar problem arises when one considers the effects of marginal changes in incarceration 
specifically on the defendant’s own future crime risk—that is, the very thing that the risk 
prediction instruments are ostensibly there to help judges minimize.  If we are going to base 
incarceration length on group averages with the objective of reducing crime, then surely the 
relevant group characteristic is how much incarcerating its members reduces crime—its elasticity 
to incarceration.  And that question is not the same as the question of recidivism probability.  
There is no particular reason to believe that groups that recidivate at higher rates are also more 
responsive to incarceration.  EBS advocates presumably think that point is intuitive: lock up the 
people who are the riskiest, and you will be preventing more crimes.  But that intuition 
oversimplifies the relationship between incarceration and recidivism. 
 Incarceration’s effect on an individual’s subsequent offending has two components.  
First, there is an incapacitation effect: while behind bars, he cannot commit crimes that he would 
have committed outside.183  If the incapacitation effect were the only effect that incarceration has 
on subsequent crime, then it would be logical to assume that the state’s incarceration resources 
are best targeted at the highest-risk offenders.   But the situation is not that simple, because of the 
second component: the effect on the defendant’s post-release crimes.  I will refer to this as the 
“specific deterrence” effect, but it is really more complicated—it includes on the one hand 
specific deterrence (fear of reincarceration) plus any rehabilitative effect of prison programming, 
and on the other hand potentially criminogenic effects of incarceration (interfering with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 A related concern is that the length of incarceration may be a confounding variable in the underlying predictive 
model. If the people who have one set of characteristics tend to get longer sentences than those with other 
characteristics, then the comparison of their recidivism rates could be apples-to-oranges, because one group’s rate is 
the average after, say, an average of 3 years of incarceration and the other group’s rate is the average after 5.  We 
thus don’t even know from the models who is the riskiest today, much less who is the riskiest X or Y number of 
years from now.   
181 HARCOURT, supra note 12, at 122-36. 
182 Id.; Bernard E. Harcourt, A Reader’s Companion to Against Prediction, 33 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 265, 269 
(2008). 
183 This incapacitation effect should be discounted for crime in prison, a complication I will bracket for simplicity.   
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subsequent employability, building criminal networks, and so forth).  There is no intuitive reason 
to assume that the specific deterrence effect is determined by, or even correlated with, the 
defendant’s recidivism risk level.  It is very possible that higher-risk defendants (or some of 
them, anyway) might be more inelastic to specific deterrence and rehabilitation, and might be 
more vulnerable to the possible criminogenic effects of incarceration.  If so, lengthening high-
risk offenders’ sentences might be more likely to increase the risk they pose after they get out, or 
at least to lower that risk less than locking up some low-risk offenders might.    
If so, this disadvantage has to be weighed against the incapacitation advantage.  
Implicitly, the current EBS instruments (by ignoring the elasticity question) embrace the premise 
that only incapacitation matters, but this is not obvious.  Most incarceration sentences are fairly 
short: in 2006, the median prison sentence in state courts was 1.7 years (and that is excluding jail 
sentences, which are shorter).184  Moreover, EBS advocates often emphasize its value in 
determining whether a person should be incarcerated at all, versus probation; presumably, in 
cases on the incarceration margin, the incarceration sentence being considered is quite short.  So, 
suppose a judge is considering whether to incarcerate a person for one year, versus zero.  In that 
case the potential incapacitation effect lasts a year—a one-year slice of the defendant’s offending 
is taken away.  But all the other effects of the judge’s choice may last, at least to some degree, 
the rest of the defendant’s lifetime after that year.   
There is simply no reason to assume the incapacitation effect is the most important factor, 
much less the only important factor—and if it is not, then the correspondence between risk 
prediction and crime-elasticity prediction may well be wholly lost.  And this complication arises 
even if one assumes the relevant state interest only relates to reducing the defendant’s crime risk.  
If we also consider effects on other individuals’ crime commission, there are many more factors 
to consider, none of which have any intuitive connection to recidivism risk scores: general 
deterrence, expressive effects on social norms, future crime risk from the defendant’s family 
members, substitution effects in criminal markets, and so forth. 
 While much of the current EBS literature totally ignores the question of responsiveness 
of recidivism risk to incarceration, some advocates have taken the general position that 
incarceration increases recidivism risk, citing as evidence simply the fact that persons released 
from prison recidivate at higher rates than probationers.185 But this reasoning relies on an apples-
to-oranges comparison.  It is unsurprising that prisoners recidivate more often than probationers, 
because prisoners are usually more serious offenders with more prior criminal history.   Also, the 
claim that incarceration generally increases recidivism would make the entire premise of EBS 
dubious: unless one is considering a life sentence, why identify the most dangerous criminals in 
order to incarcerate them if incarceration will only make them more dangerous?  Risk prevention 
is only a plausible justification for incarceration if the sign on incarceration’s effects goes the 
other way for at least some offenders—and a truly useful risk prediction instrument would try to 
identify who those offenders are.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006—Statistics tbl. 1.3 (2009), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf. 
185 E.g., McGarraugh, supra , at 1107; Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of Principles 
of Evidence-Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 585, 594 (2009); Michael A. 
Wolff, Lock ‘Em Up and Throw Away the Key?  Cutting Recidivism by Analyzing Sentencing Outcomes, 20 FED. 
SENT. R. 320, 320 (2008).  
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Drawing solid causal inferences in this area is difficult.  Some studies have used 
regression or matching methods to compare recidivism rates after controlling for observed 
characteristics like crime type and criminal history. 186  But while this approach is better than a 
raw comparison of means, it still does not produce strong causal identification.  Causal inference 
based on regression depends on the assumption that all the important potentially confounding 
variables have been observed and controlled for.  This assumption is often not valid, so one has 
to be very cautious not to interpret regression results to mean more than they do.    
A particular concern arises when the treatment variable of interest (here, incarceration) 
might itself be influenced by a decision-maker’s anticipation of the outcome of interest (here, 
recidivism).  Measuring a statistical association between the two variables provides no way to 
disentangle which component comes from incarceration causing recidivism, which from 
anticipated recidivism risk causing incarceration, and which from other confounding variables 
that affect both sentencing decisions and recidivism outcomes.   Regression does not solve the 
reverse causality problem unless the control variables in the regression account for all the 
reasons that a judge might think a defendant poses a higher risk.   As we have seen already, 
though, even the best recidivism models do not even come close to accounting for all of the 
sources of individual variation in risk.  They surely do not account for all of the sources of 
variation in judicial anticipation of risk, either—for instance, judges’ appraisal of the detailed 
facts of the case or defendants’ courtroom demeanor. 
Some recidivism studies have used more rigorous quasi-experimental methods to assess 
causation, seeking to exploit an exogenous source of variation in incarceration length—that is, a 
source of variation that is not itself affected by anticipated recidivism risk or by any of the other 
various factors that affect recidivism risk. 187  Several studies take advantage of the random 
assignment of judges or public defenders.  The intuition is that getting randomly assigned to a 
particularly harsh judge, or to a less capable public defender, will tend to increase a defendant’s 
sentence in a way unrelated to the defendant’s characteristics—thus, while the sentence is not 
entirely random, it has an effectively random component.  Instrumental variables methods are 
used to estimate the effect of this exogenous increase in sentences on subsequent recidivism.  
Other studies take advantage of legal reforms that introduce sentencing variation.188 
These studies have fairly consistently found that increased sentence length on average 
reduces subsequent offending, although the effect seems to be nonlinear—the marginal effect of 
increasing sentence lengths declines and eventually disappears as sentence lengths get longer.189   
Thus, specific deterrence lengths on average cut in the same direction as incapacitation effects 
do.190  Reported incapacitation effects typically appear larger,191 but the results of the two types 
of studies are hard compare. Incapacitation studies generally estimate the number of crimes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 See, e.g., Oregon Dep’t of Corrections, The Effectiveness of Community-Based Sanctions in Reducing Recidivism 
18-19 (Sept. 2002). 
187 For a useful recent review of this literature, see David A. Abrams, The Imprisoner’s Dilemma: A Cost-Benefit 
Approach to Incarceration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 905, 929-36 (2013).  
188 E.g., Shawn D. Bushway & Emily G. Owens, Framing Punishment: A New Look at Incarceration and 
Deterrence (Jan. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), www.human.cornell.edu/pam/people/upload/Framing-Jan-
2010.pdf; Ilyana Kuziemko, Going Off Parole: How the Elimination of Discretionary Prison Release Affects the 
Social Cost of Crime 13-22 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13380, 2007), available at http:// 
www.nber.org/papers/w13380.pdf? 
189 See Abrams, supra, at 936. 
190 Id. at 936-39 (reviewing incapacitation studies)..  
191 Id. 
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avoided during each “person-year” of incarceration,192 measuring incapacitation’s full effect, 
whereas specific deterrence studies of subsequent recidivism do not estimate the full specific 
deterrence effect (that is, the change in crime commission over the defendant’s whole remaining 
lifetime).  Instead, such studies mostly have quite short follow-up periods, and generally measure 
not number of crimes committed but recidivism “survival,” i.e., whether an offender makes it 
through the study period without being rearrested or reconvicted, and if not, how long he lasts.193  
Moreover, incapacitation studies sometimes use reported crime as their measure,194 whereas 
recidivism studies use the more underinclusive measures of rearrest or reconviction. 
 Regardless, what the existing research on causal effects has not done is to estimate either 
specific deterrence or incapacitation elasticities that are conditional on the kinds of 
characteristics that are included in the EBS risk prediction instruments.  Instead, the research has 
focused on estimating the causal relationship between incarceration and crime at a more general 
level, perhaps subdivided by broad crime category or by deciles of the sentencing-severity 
distribution, but not by detailed socioeconomic, demographic, and family characteristics.   One 
Urban Institute study, by Avi Bhati, does estimate incapacitation elasticities that are gender, race, 
and state-specific, but not specific deterrence elasticities, and not broken down by socioeconomic 
status.  It finds no major differences in the total number of crimes averted by either gender or 
race.195  Notably, variations by state were far more dramatic, suggesting the need to worry about 
another problem with the risk prediction instruments: extrapolation from the sample on which 
they were developed to different offender pools in different jurisdictions.  A study by Ilyana 
Kuziemko on specific deterrence effects finds that incarceration length increases have a “much 
stronger deterrent effect for older offenders than younger ones, for whom time served actually 
weakly increases recidivism.” That is, young age—one of the most heavily weighted predictors 
of increased recidivism risk in the current instruments—actually appears to correspond to a 
lower effectiveness of incarceration length increases in deterring post-release recidivism.  This 
suggests that the EBS instruments are weighing this factor in the wrong direction. 
 Perhaps future research will improve matters. To effectively inform the state’s pursuit of 
its penological objectives, the research underlying future instruments would have to satisfy the 
following criteria: 
(1) the use of valid causal identification methods, e.g., exploiting random assignment of 
judges; 
(2) application of those methods to obtain estimates for incarceration’s effects that are 
interacted with the variables that the state seeks to include in the instrument; 
(3) accounting for nonlinear effects of incarceration length (e.g., the effect of a tenth year of 
incarceration is probably not the same as the effect of a first); 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 E.g., Rucker Johnson & Steven Raphael, How Much Crime Reduction Does the Marginal Prisoner Buy? 28 (Oct. 
2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~ruckerj/johnson_raphael_crimeincarcJLE.pdf. 
193 E.g., Kuziemko, supra, at 22. 
194 E.g., Johnson & Raphael, supra, at 24 
195 E.g., Avi Bhati, An Information Theoretic Method for Estimating the Number of Crimes Averted by 
Incapacitation, Urban Institute Research Report 24 tbl. 2 (July 2007) (showing estimated male elasticities that were 
slightly greater in most states, but not in every state and by very small margins). Expressed as a percentage 
reduction in crime rate, rather than an absolute number of crimes averted, females were actually more responsive to 
incarceration in every state studied.  Id. at 27 tbl. 4.3.   
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(4) long enough follow-up periods to allow researchers to meaningfully approximate the 
change in an individual’s lifetime recidivism risk;196  
(5) incorporation of both incapacitation and specific deterrence effects, with comparable 
outcome measures;  
(6) testing of the instrument within the jurisdiction in which it will be used, on a 
representative sample; and 
(7) evidence of substantial additional explanatory power for each constitutionally 
problematic variable that the state seeks to include. 
The current instruments do not do anything like this, and I am not optimistic that this research 
challenge will be overcome soon.  And even it is, the above-discussed problems concerning the 
uncertainty of individual predictions would still apply to the prediction of individual elasticities.   
Finally, it might also be objected that it would be unfair to treat an individual’s greater 
expected responsiveness to incarceration as the basis for incarcerating her for longer—offenders 
might be penalized for not being incorrigible.  I am sympathetic to this objection.  But once 
sentencing is based on predicting future actions on the basis of demographic and socioeconomic 
considerations, “fairness” is no longer a decisive sentencing criterion anyway.  I do not really 
advocate it, but at least an elasticity-prediction sentencing instrument would be connected to the 
state’s penological interests.  The current instruments are not.  
IV. Will Risk Prediction Instruments Really Change Sentencing Practice? 
 Advocates of EBS sometimes defend it against disparity and retributive justice objects by 
arguing that it will not really change very much at all.  These “defenses” come in two forms.  
The first is to observe the risk prediction instruments don’t directly determine the sentence--they 
merely provide information to judges.  The second defense is that minimization of the 
defendant’s future crime risk already plays an important role in sentencing, so perhaps EBS 
merely replaces judges’ individual judgments of that risk with more accurate actuarial 
predictions.  I address these points in Sections A and B, respectively. 
 A.  Does EBS Merely Provide Information? 
One response to disparity concerns is to defend the instruments as innocuous insofar as 
they only provide information, rather than completely controlling the sentence.197 The judge can 
take or leave the information, supplement it with her own clinical assessments of risk, and weigh 
other, non-recidivism-related factors.  As a constitutional defense of EBS, this point could be 
framed in two ways.  The strong form of the argument would assert that the state’s adoption of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Collecting data on an offender’s entire life is unrealistic, but follow-up periods substantially longer than the 
typical one or two years are needed.  Most people eventually desist from crime, and people who have not recidivated 
for 7 or 8 years (after release, if they were incarcerated) have quite low subsequent recidivism rates. E.g., Megan C. 
Kurlychek, Robert Brame, & Shawn D. Bushway, Scarlet Letters and Recidivism: Does an Old Criminal Record 
Predict Future Offending?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 483 (2006). Thus, to study the effect of a first year of 
incarceration (versus none), eight or ten years of outcome data would probably be fine.  The study should simply 
estimate total crime by each individual over a fixed period of time beginning at sentencing, conditional on (among 
other things) the share of that time that is spent in prison—that measure would incorporate both incapacitation and 
specific deterrence effects. 
197 E.g., Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 573 (Ind. 2010); David E. Patton, Guns, Crime Control, and a 
Systemic Approach to Federal Sentencing, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1427, 1456 (2011); Kleiman, supra, at 301. 
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the risk prediction instrument does not itself amount to disparate “treatment” at all.  Rather, it 
merely provides social scientific information to a government decision-maker, and surely the 
Constitution does not require sentencing judges to be ill-informed. 
The problem with this framing, however, is that the point of evidence-based sentencing is 
for the sentence to be based on the statistical “evidence,” at least in part.  The risk score is not 
calculated for academic purposes.  Even if the instrument itself is “only information,” the 
sentencing process that incorporates it is not.  Sentencing law already tells judges to consider 
recidivism risk,198and the instrument tells the judge how to calculate that risk.  Inescapably, 
unless judges completely ignore the instruments (rendering them pointless), some defendants 
will receive longer sentences than they would have but for their group characteristics, such as 
youth, male gender, or poverty.  And that, indeed, is the whole point: if the state did not want 
unemployed people to be, on average, given longer sentences than otherwise-identical employed 
people, why put unemployment in the risk prediction instrument? Moreover, arguably even the 
information provision itself is constitutionally troubling: it represents state endorsement of 
statistical generalizations like those that, in the gender and poverty contexts, the Supreme Court 
has condemned. 
To be sure, for any individual defendant, each factor included in the risk prediction 
models is not the only determinant of the sentence—it is merely one determinant of the risk 
score.   If a court were looking for ways to distinguish Bearden, it could seize on this difference.  
That case involved revocation of probation, and the Court emphasized that because the trial court 
had initially chosen probation, it was clear that “the State is seeking here to use as the sole 
justification for imprisonment the poverty of a probationer.”199  This distinction is unpersuasive, 
however.  Anything treated as a sentencing factor will at least sometimes solely trigger a change 
in the sentence relative to what it would otherwise have been. To give a simple illustration, if a 
sentence is based on crime severity plus gender, and these factors together produce a 10-year 
sentence for a male when an otherwise identical woman would have received seven years, male 
gender is not solely responsible for the sentence; crime severity establishes the baseline of seven 
years.  But male gender is solely responsible for the extra three years.    
 If this point is slightly more obscured in EBS cases than in Bearden itself, it is only 
because judges won’t routinely state what alternative sentence they would have given if the 
defendant had had different characteristics.  In Bearden the dispositive role of poverty could not 
be hidden because of the posture of the case: the defendant had been sentenced to probation and 
restitution until he failed to pay.  But surely if a court’s decision-making is unconstitutional in 
substance, it cannot become constitutional through obscurity of reasoning.  In any event, here the 
use of the discriminatory factor is not obscure, even if its specific consequence for any given 
defendant is not transparent.   A defendant subjected to an unconstitutional decision-making 
process should be entitled to resentencing.200 Notably, the Supreme Court has often applied 
heightened constitutional scrutiny to the mere consideration of constitutionally suspect factors.  
In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, for instance, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny 
to the use of race as one of many factors in university admissions—indeed, as Justice Ginsburg 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 E.g., 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). 
199 Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671. 
200 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
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characterized it in dissent, as a “factor of a factor of a factor of a factor” that very likely was not 
the reason that the plaintiff in the case was denied admission.201  
 The claim that “it’s just information” thus should not enable EBS to avoid heightened 
equal protection scrutiny.  A weaker, and more persuasive, version of this claim is that it should 
make it easier for EBS to survive such scrutiny under a “narrow tailoring” requirement.   
Analogously, in the affirmative action cases, the Court has held that race may be used as a “plus 
factor” (if there is no race-neutral alternative that will suffice), but it has squarely rejected the 
use of racial quotas.202  But the fact that the risk prediction instruments do not completely 
displace all other sentencing factors is a point in its favor when assessing narrow tailoring, but it 
is hardly dispositive, as Fisher suggests.  One must also consider the extent to which they 
advance the state’s interests as well as the availability of alternatives.   
Moreover, although Fisher made narrow tailoring somewhat challenging to demonstrate 
even in the affirmative action context, it should be even harder to show in the EBS context.  
Educational affirmative action involves a state interest that is itself defined in race-conscious 
terms: student body diversity, of which “racial or ethnic origin” is an “important element,” 
although not the only one.203  It is more than plausible that considering race as one admissions 
factor is narrowly tailored to the objective of ensuring racial diversity, and that no totally race-
blind alternative will suffice to achieve that objective.  In the EBS context, however, the state’s 
penological interests are not defined in group-conscious terms, and the problematic 
classifications in the instruments are not so closely linked to those interests. 
B.  Does EBS Merely Replace One Form of Risk Prediction With Another? 
 Another response to the disparity concern (and to the retributivist objection raised by 
other critics) is to say that none of this is new: risk prediction is already part of sentencing.204 If 
judges are not given statistical risk predictions, many will predict risk on their own, perhaps 
relying implicitly on many of the same factors that the statistical instruments use, such as gender, 
age, and poverty; actuarial instruments will merely allow them to do so more accurately.205  One 
could take this argument further: Conceivably, judges’ current clinical assessments could 
overweight some of those variables relative to the weights assigned by the actuarial 
instruments.206 These possibilities not been empirically tested and cannot be ruled out.   
As a constitutional matter, this “substitution” defense is not very persuasive.   It is not 
likely that courts would uphold an across-the-board state policy explicitly endorsing an otherwise 
impermissible sentencing criterion on the rationale that the same variables might sometimes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201  Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S.__, ___ (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
202  Fisher, 570 U.S. at __. 
203 Id. at __. 
204 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 3553. 
205 See, e.g., Oleson, supra, at 1373; Patton, supra, at 1456; Jennifer Skeem, Risk Technology in Sentencing: Testing 
the Promises and Perils, 30 JUSTICE Q. 297 (2013); Bergstrom & Kern, supra, at 2; Commentary to Draft MPC § 
6B.09; Michael H. Marcus, MPC--The Root of the Problem: Just Deserts and Risk Assessment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 751, 
757 (2009); Branham, supra, at 169. 
206 This is perhaps a particularly realistic possibility with respect to race, because of its absence from the 
instruments: if judges currently implicitly take race into account in predicting recidivism risk, it is possible that 
giving them a statistical prediction that is not race-specific could cause them to stop doing so.  Thus, even if EBS 
increases the weight given to socioeconomic variables that are correlated with race, it could reduce the weight given 
to race itself, offsetting or even reversing its expected effect on racial disparity. 
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already have been used sub rosa.  In general, the difficulty of eradicating subtle unconstitutional 
discrimination does not justify codifying or formally endorsing it.   
Moreover, the “substitution” defense depends on a questionable empirical premise.  Do 
the EBS instruments really merely substitute one form of risk prediction for another?  Or does 
providing judges with statistical estimates of recidivism risk increase the salience of recidivism 
prevention in their decision-making vis-à-vis other punishment objectives?  Notably, some EBS 
advocates affirmatively express the hope that EBS will lead to an expanded emphasis on 
recidivism prevention.207  If it does, it will almost surely increase the role of the individual 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics used in the EBS instruments.  Those 
characteristics are not relevant to retributive motivations for punishment (or may even cut the 
other direction). 
There are logical reasons to suspect that EBS might increase the emphasis judges place 
on risk prediction.  Most judges no doubt recognize that predicting recidivism risk is difficult, 
and that difficulty might well lead many of them to discount this factor.  If such a judge is 
presented with a quantified risk assessment framed as scientifically established, they may well 
give it more weight.208 In many other legal, policy, and other decision-making contexts, scholars 
have observed that judges and other decision-makers often defer to scientific models that they do 
not really understand, and to “expert” viewpoints.209  Moreover, sentencing is high-stakes, 
complex decision-making that many judges describe as weighing heavily on their emotions,210 
rendering the use of a simple, seemingly objective algorithm potentially appealing.211  For 
elected judges, research has shown that political considerations influence sentences,212 and 
reliance on risk predictions might provide political cover for release decisions while making it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 E.g., Hyatt, Bergstrom, & Chanenson, supra, at 266. 
208 See Hannah-Moffat, supra, at 7 (“Risk scores impart a moral certainty and legitimacy into the classifications that 
they produce, ‘allowing people to accept them as normative classifications and therefore as scripts for action.”); 
Harcourt, supra, at 273 (describing the “pull of prediction”). 
209 E.g., Janine Pearson, Construing Crane: Examining How State Courts Have Applied its Lack-of-Control 
Standard, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1527, 1550-53 (2012) (discussing jury overreliance on expert testimony of 
dangerousness in civil commitment hearings); Michael H. Shapiro, Updating Constitutional Doctrine: An Extended 
Response to the Critique of Compulsory Vaccination, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 87, 128-29 
(discussing the problem of judicial overreliance on expert claims of causation); Kathryn M. Campbell, Expert 
Estimates from ‘Social’ Scientists, 16 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 13 (2011); Robert L. Kane, Creating Practice Guidelines: 
The Dangers of Over-Reliance on Expert Judgment, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 62, 63 (1995); Robert E. Schween & 
Steven P. Larson, 32 ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. INST. PROC. 22 (1986) (describing courts’ and policymakers 
tendency to overrely on models and perceived expertise in the environmental context); Case, Problems in Judicial 
Review Arising From the Use of Computer Models and Other Quantitative Methodologies in Environmental 
Decision Making, 10 B.C. L. REV. 251, 256 (1982) (same). 
210 See Oleson, supra, at 1330 & n.2 (citing sources); D. Brock Hornby, Speaking in Sentences, 14 Green Bag 2d 
147, 157 (2011); Judge Robert Pratt, The Implications of Padilla v. Kentucky on Practice in United States District 
Courts, 31 ST. LOUIS UNIV. PUBLIC L. REV. 169, 169 (2011) (“Sentencing is unquestionably the most difficult job of 
any district court judge.”); Judge Thomas M. Hardiman, Foreword, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 637, 637 (2011) (“Any 
preconceived notions that a judge may have about sentencing upon taking the bench are quickly dwarfed by the 
awesome responsibility it entails.”). 
211 This point may help to explain the continuing heavy weight federal judges give to the sentencing guidelines that 
they are not required to follow. 
212 Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 
48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 261 (2004) (finding that judges increase sentences as elections approach). 
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politically difficult to release offenders rated as high-risk.213  Prosecutors might similarly feel 
political pressure to push for harsh sentences for offenders rated high-risk, but free to offer better 
deals to those rated low-risk.214 
To be sure, some of the research on clinical versus actuarial prediction has suggested that 
clinicians may resist reliance on actuarial instruments, but that research comes from medical and 
mental health diagnosis settings in which the clinician may be much more confident in their 
professional diagnostic skills than judges are in their ability to foresee a defendant’s future.215  
Even if a particular judge does not really trust the instrument, its prediction might influence her 
thinking through anchoring.216  And presenting the judge with a risk prediction instrument may 
simply remind her that risk is a central basis on which the state expects her to base punishment. 
All of this is speculative; no empirical research documents how risk prediction 
instruments affect judges’ weighting of recidivism risk versus other factors.  To provide some 
suggestive evidence informing the question, I carried out a small experimental study, with 83 law 
students as subjects.  All subjects were given the same fact patterns describing two criminal 
defendants and told to recommend a sentence for each.  The key experimental variation was that 
for half the subjects, the descriptions also included a paragraph with the defendant’s score on a 
Recidivism Risk Prediction Instrument (RRPI) and a brief explanation of what the RRPI was.   
The cases involved the same conviction (grand larceny of $100,000 worth of jewelry) and 
the same minimal criminal history (one misdemeanor underage-drinking conviction).  Both 
defendants were male, and no race was mentioned.  Beyond that, their characteristics varied 
sharply.  Robert was a middle-aged, married, college-educated executive in a jewelry store chain, 
and was motivated to steal from the chain’s stores by concern about the cost of his daughters’ 
college education.  William was a 21-year-old, single, unemployed, alcoholic high school 
dropout with incarcerated siblings, recently evicted from his parents’ home, who was visiting a 
mall looking for retail work when he saw a jewelry display case open and spontaneously grabbed 
a bunch of items.  These fact patterns allowed some possible distinctions between the 
defendants’ criminal conduct. William’s crime was spontaneous, while Robert’s involved an 
extended course of conduct, elaborate deceptive behavior (replacement of the jewels with fakes), 
and arguably more victims (buyers of the fakes).  These distinctions allowed subjects primarily 
motivated by retribution to have a possible basis for distinguishing the two—likely in William’s 
favor—whereas those inclined to rely on a defendant’s characteristics to assess future 
dangerousness would likely give William a longer sentence.217  Subjects were given a wide 
statutory sentencing range (zero to 20 years) and not told what punishment theories to prioritize. 
All subjects were given all these underlying facts; the difference was whether they were 
also translated into an RRPI score.  Robert’s probability of recidivism was rated “low risk” while 
William’s was “moderate-to-high risk.”  Although the RRPI is fictional, these ratings 
realistically approximate the difference that one would see using real instruments.  For instance, 
on the Missouri instrument’s -8 to 7 scale, Robert would have a perfect score of 7, while William 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Hannah-Moffat, supra, at 30 (“The use of risk scores can have considerable cache[t] with ‘elected’ judges and 
prosecutors who must defend their decisions to an electorate concerned with security.”). 
214 Id. 
215 E.g., Atul Gawande, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO (2009). 
216 See Prescott & Starr, supra, at 325-30 (reviewing anchoring research); Cass R. Sunstein et. al., Predictably 
Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1170 (2002). 
217 Students’ comments after completing the exercise supported this interpretation. 
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would score -1 (“below average”).  Subjects considered the scenarios in a prescribed, 
randomized order. 
The results in Table 2 suggest that the RRPI score sharply affected the relative sentences 
some subjects gave to Robert and William.  Among the 43 students who were not given the 
RRPI score, 17 gave Robert (the “low-risk” defendant) the higher sentence, 13 gave them the 
same sentence, and 13 gave William the higher sentence.  Among the 40 students who received 
the RRPI score, only 8 gave Robert the higher sentence, 9 gave them the same sentence, and 23 
gave William the higher sentence.   
Table	  2:	  An	  Experiment:	  Risk	  Prediction	  Instruments	  and	  Relative	  Sentence	  Outcomes	  
	   (1)	  Robert	  Higher	   (2)	  William	  Higher	  
(3)	  Which	  Higher?	  	  	  	  	  
(William,	  Same,	  Robert)	   (4)	  Sentence	  
	   (Probit)	   (Probit)	   (Ordered	  Probit)	   (OLS)	  
RRPI	   -­‐0.603*	   0.710*	   0.662**	   -­‐0.871	  
	   (0.305)	   (0.284)	   (0.257)	   (0.733)	  
William	   	   	   	   -­‐0.711	  
	   	   	   	   (0.473)	  
william*RRPI	   	   	   	   1.67*	  
	   	   	   	   (0.61)	  
Cols.	  1	  &	  2	  show	  probit	  regressions	  of	  indicators	  for	  giving	  the	  "low-­‐risk"	  or	  "high-­‐risk"	  defendant,	  respectively,	  
a	   higher	   sentence.	   	   Col.	   3	   shows	   an	   ordered	   probit	   regression	   of	   a	   variable	   valued	   at	   2	   if	   the	   high-­‐risk	  
defendant’s	   sentence	   was	   higher,	   1	   if	   they	   received	   the	   same	   sentence,	   and	   0	   if	   the	   low-­‐risk	   defendant’s	  
sentence	  was	  higher.	  	  Col.	  4	  is	  an	  OLS	  regression	  with	  sentence	  in	  years	  as	  the	  outcome.	  	  An	  indicator	  for	  which	  
case	  the	  subjects	  considered	  first	  was	  also	  included.	  	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses.	  	  *p<0.05,	  **p<0.01	  
 
I assessed the size and statistical significance of this shift toward higher sentences for 
William in several ways, using different definitions of the outcome variable.  First, I used probit 
regressions to estimate the change in the probabilities that Robert would be given a higher 
sentence (Col. 1) or that William would (Col. 2.).  These two are not just mirror-image inquiries, 
since there is a third option of giving both the same sentence. I next used an ordinal probit 
regression to assess change in the relative probability of each of these three possible outcomes 
(Col. 3).  Next, I used the recommended sentence, in years, as the outcome variable, an approach 
that takes into account the magnitude and not just the direction of the sentencing distinctions 
(Col. 4).  The results are statistically significant, and fairly sizeable, in all specifications.  The 
use of the RRPI instrument is associated with an increase in William’s sentence, relative to 
Robert’s, of about 1.67 years (that is, 20 months), or about one-third of the overall average 
sentence (5 years). The average sentence given to William was about 0.8 years higher in the 
RRPI condition; the average sentence given to Robert was about 0.9 years lower.218 
A reasonable interpretation of these results is that receiving the RRPI score caused at 
least some subjects to emphasize recidivism risk more, relative to other sentencing 
considerations, than they would have otherwise.  Moreover, the instrument’s apparent effect on 
sentences was not unidirectional—the instrument’s estimated effect on the difference between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Subjects who were given William’s case first gave significantly higher sentences to both defendants than those 
who were given Robert’s case first.  But order did not significantly affect the relative sentences given nor the effect 
of the RRPI. 
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the two defendants reflected a combination of an increase in the high-risk defendant’s sentence 
and a reduction in the low-risk defendant’s sentence.   
These results provide a piece of suggestive evidence that quantified risk assessments 
might affect the weight placed on different sentencing considerations.  However, the study is 
small, and moreover, although much experimental research on decision-making uses student 
subjects, one has to be cautious in extrapolating the results of such studies to “real world” 
settings.  A real criminal case is not a four-paragraph vignette, and judges are not law students—
their experience and expertise may make them less suggestible.  Still, it cannot be assumed that 
judges are wholly resistant to attempts to influence their sentencing decision-making.  After all, 
judges tend to defer to non-binding sentencing guidelines, and research from other legal settings 
suggests that courts tend to defer to scientific expertise.219  While it remains an unsettled 
question, for now there is no empirical evidence pointing the other way, and little reason to 
believe that EBS will merely substitute one form of risk prediction for another. 
CONCLUSION 
The inclusion of demographic and socioeconomic variables in risk prediction instruments 
that are used to shape incarceration sentences is normatively troubling and, at least with respect 
to gender and socioeconomic variables, very likely unconstitutional.  As the EBS movement 
charges full steam ahead, advocates have minimized the first concern and almost wholly ignored 
the second.  This is a mistake.  To be sure, EBS has an understandable appeal to those seeking a 
politically palatable way to cut back on the United States’ sprawling system of mass 
incarceration.  It is difficult to persuade policymakers to reduce incarceration at the cost of 
increased crime, and EBS offers a technocratic solution to this normative dilemma: just identify 
the people who can be released without increasing crime.  But this identification is not that easy, 
and moreover, there is no reason to assume, and no good way to ensure, that EBS will only lead 
to sentences being reduced.  Even if it does, there is something troubling, at best, about using 
group identity and socioeconomic privilege as a basis for reducing defendants’ sentences.   
Note that while I have focused on sentencing, essentially the same arguments apply to 
use of actuarial instruments in - decisions, which is now routine in thirty states, including almost 
all of those that have not abolished discretionary parole.220 This practice has been given little 
attention by legal scholars or the public,221 and has rarely been challenged in court, perhaps 
because of the absence of counsel in parole proceedings or because parole decision-making is not 
very transparent.  Many prisoners may not even know of the existence of the risk prediction 
instruments, much less understand how they work or their constitutional infirmities.222  But while 
risk prediction unquestionably is properly central to the parole decision,223 the use of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 See supra note 209. 
220 HARCOURT, supra, at 78-80. 
221 Scholarly criticism has focused on procedural concerns—mainly on the prisoner’s lack of counsel at parole 
hearings.  For this reason, the MPC claims to “‘domesticate[]’ the use of risk assessments by repositioning them in 
the open forum of the courtroom”—that is, by using them in sentencing instead of in parole (which the MPC seeks 
to abolish entirely).   Draft MPC § 6B.09 cmt. (a).  See also McGarraugh, supra (advocating barring the instruments 
at parole but using them in sentencing).   
222  In some states, the basis for the parole decision is confidential by law, so the parole board may refuse the 
prisoner’s request to see the risk assessment.  McGarraugh, supra, at 1079 & n.5.  
223 Indeed, risk is arguably the only legitimate parole consideration, because considerations such as retributive 
justice or general deterrence have already been considered by the sentencing judge.  The only reason to leave the 
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demographic and socioeconomic variables to predict risk raises the same disparate treatment 
concerns that EBS does.224  Moreover, the parole context may offer additional available 
alternatives to the constitutionally objectionable variables.  For instance, rather than basing 
parole decisions on a prisoner’s prior education or employment, one could consider his efforts 
while in prison to improve his future prospects, such as participation in job training or education 
programs.  Such factors would speak to the prisoner’s individual efforts to achieve rehabilitation, 
rather than to his socioeconomic background.  
In contrast, it is easier to defend the use of risk prediction instruments in assignment of 
prisoners, probationers, and parolees to correctional and reentry programming (e.g., job training), 
and to shape conditions of supervised release (e.g., drug tests).225  In this context, risk assessment 
is often combined with instruments assessing “criminological needs” and predicting 
“responsivity” to various such interventions. The empirical merits of such instruments are 
beyond this paper’s scope, though I note that the responsivity instruments at least address the 
right question: what can be gained by treating an offender in a certain way?  In any event, such 
uses of actuarial instruments raise less serious constitutional and policy concerns.  To be sure, 
supervision conditions may be burdensome, especially if they affect the likelihood that probation 
or parole will be revoked, and programming decisions can affect access to valuable services. 
Still, the stakes are not as high as they are in sentencing, and therefore there is less reason to 
apply heightened scrutiny to socioeconomic classifications and other traits that are not treated as 
suspect outside the criminal justice context.  Distributing access to correctional programming 
based on risk, needs, and responsivity assessments is not particularly different from distributing 
access to non-correctional social services and government benefits to those populations who 
most need them, which is a routine government function, subject to rational basis review unless 
suspect or quasi-suspect classifications are involved.  
In sentencing, however, the defendant’s most fundamental liberties and interests are at stake, 
as are the interests of families and communities.  EBS advocates have not made a persuasive 
case that this crucial decision should turn on a defendant’s gender, poverty, or other group 
characteristics.  The risk prediction instruments offer little meaningful guidance as to each 
individual’s recidivism risk, and they do not even attempt to offer guidance as to the way in 
which sentencing choices affect that risk.  The instruments, and the problematic variables, 
advance the state’s penological interests weakly if at all, and there are alternatives available.  
Risk prediction is here to stay as part of sentencing, and perhaps actuarial instruments can play a 
legitimate role.  But they should not include these problematic variables, which do not offer 
much additional predictive value once crime characteristics and criminal history are taken into 
account.  The current instruments simply do not justify the cost of state endorsement of express 
discrimination in sentencing. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sentence indeterminate is to account for the fact that recidivism risk may evolve over time; those who believe risk 
prediction is an improper basis for punishment should simply oppose indeterminate sentencing.  See, e.g., 
Christopher Slobogin, Prevention as the Primary Goal of Sentencing: The Modern Case for Indeterminate 
Sentencing, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1127, 1128-30 (2011). 
224 Note that while the Supreme Court once labeled parole an “act of grace,” the deprivation of which a prisoner 
could not contest, this theory is now considered “long-discredited.”  Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 864 n.5 
(2006). States have no obligation to provide a system of parole, but once they do, its operation is constrained by the 
Constitution.  Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 378 (1987); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1982). 
225 See Nat’l Ctr for State Cts, supra, at 16-20; Warren, supra; Melissa Aubin, The District of Oregon Reentry 
Court: An Evidence-Based Model, 22 Fed. Sent. R. 39 (2009) (discussing evidence-based practices in federal 
“reentry courts”). 
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